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MISSING POLICE BODY CAMERA VIDEOS: 
REMEDIES, EVIDENTIARY FAIRNESS, AND 
AUTOMATIC ACTIVATION 
Mary D. Fan*
A movement toward police regulation by recording is 
sweeping the nation.  Responding to calls for 
accountability, transparency and better evidence, 
departments have rapidly adopted body cameras.  
Recording policies require the police to record more law 
enforcement encounters than ever before.  But what 
happens if officers do not record?  This is an important, 
growing area of controversy.  Based on the collection 
and coding of police department body camera policies, 
this Article reveals widespread detection and 
enforcement gaps regarding failures to record as 
required.  More than half of the major-city departments 
in the sample have no provisions specifying 
consequences for not recording as required—and 
several have protections against discipline.   
 The Article discusses how the labor-management 
structure of departments and the individual-blame 
nature of disciplinary processes render internal 
departmental enforcement of recording rules 
challenging.  As the central framers of conduct rules for 
police, and as gatekeepers of evidence, courts have an 
important role to play in addressing the missing video 
problem.  The challenge is how to frame remedies that 
avoid judicial inquiry deterrence: a reluctance to 
address missing video issues because it would entail 
messy and costly collateral mini-trials on whether 
recordings are missing for legitimate reasons or due to 
                                                                                                                   
 *  Henry M. Jackson Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. Many 
thanks to Ryan Lee Giles, Lee Dean Whatling and the team at the Georgia Law Review for
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officer malfeasance.  This Article proposes three 
judicial pretrial remedies that proceed from a more 
administrable evidentiary fairness perspective: 
exclusion of partial recordings, favorable inferences, 
and pattern and practice detection harnessing systemic 
facts accumulated by courts in criminal cases. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Why did a Minneapolis police officer shoot Justine Damond 
after she called to report a possible sexual assault?1  The officers at 
the scene were wearing body cameras, but they did not record the 
fatal encounter.2  The officers in Baton Rouge who fatally shot 
Alton Sterling also were wearing body camerasɆbut both of the 
officers involved reported that their cameras fell off.3  Officers also 
were wearing body cameras when Keith Scott died in Charlotte,4
and when Paul O’Neal died in Chicago.5  The officer wearing a 
body camera at the scene of Scott’s death did not activate the 
camera to capture both audio and video until after the shooting.6
The officer who fired the fatal shot into O’Neal’s back during a foot 
pursuit also did not hit record until after the fatal shot.7  The 
police departments involved in each shooting were among the 
hundreds nationwide that have adopted police-worn body cameras 
in recent years to rebuild public trust.8  Each of the departments’ 
                                                                                                                   
1 Andy Mannix, 911 Call Transcript: Before Being Shot by Officer, Justine Damond Called 
in Possible Rape, MINN. STAR TRIB. (July 19, 2017, 9:24 PM), http://www.startribune.com/911-
call-before-being-shot-by-officer-justine-damond-called-in-possible-rape/435423423/. 
2 Mark Berman, What the Minneapolis Police Shooting Tells Us About the Limits of Body 
Cameras, WASH. POST (July 19, 2017), http://wapo.st/2uAnJ0I. 
3 See Kimbriell Kelly et al., Fatal Shootings by Police Remain Relatively Unchanged After 
Two Years, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2016), http://wapo.st/2hBOTix (“[P]olice said body cameras 
‘fell off’ the officers . . . as they responded to a call about a man with a gun outside of a 
convenience store.”); see also Aliyah Frumin, After Baton Rouge Shooting, Questions Swirl 
Around Body Cam Failures, NBC NEWS (July 7, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/after-baton-rouge-shooting-questions-swirl-around-body-cam-failures-n605386?cid=e 
m1_onsite.  
4 See Wesley Lowery, Charlotte Officer Did Not Activate Body Camera Until After Keith 
Scott Had Been Shot, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2016), http://wapo.st/2cwPtXn. 
5 See Annie Sweeney & Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Police: Body Camera Didn’t Record Cop’s 
Fatal Shooting of Teen in Back, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 2, 2016, 7:04 AM), http://www.chicagotribun 
e.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-police-shooting-eddie-johnson-met-20160801-story.html. 
6 See Lowery, supra note 4 (describing the Scott shooting). 
7 William Lee, Autopsy: Paul O’Neal Fatally Shot by Police in Back, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 17, 
2016, 8:13 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-police-shooti 
ng-eddie-johnson-met-20160801-story.html. 
8 See Mike Maciag, Survey: Almost All Police Departments Plan to Use Body Cameras,
GOVERNING (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-polic 
e-body-camera-survey.html (reporting on the uptake of police-worn body cameras among 
departments across the nation); Brent McDonald & Hillary Bachelder, With Rise of Body 
Cameras, New Tests of Transparency and Trust, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2j 
axwBF (describing the challenges faced by police departments nationwide in rolling out a 
body-camera program). 
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policies mandated recording in the context where the shooting 
occurred, unless it was unsafe to do so.9  The practice on the 
ground, however, did not follow the rules on the books.  Numerous 
other such cases and controversies involving a failure to record 
have arisen across the nation.10   
                                                                                                                   
9 See CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBERG POLICE DEP’T, INTERACTIVE DIRECTIVES GUIDE,
DIRECTIVE 400-005 (effective May 11, 2015), https://www.rcfp.org/bodycam_policies/NC/Charl 
otte_BWC_Policy.pdf (“Officers will ensure that DMVR equipment (both video and audio) is 
activated and operating properly and that the video recorder is positioned and adjusted to 
record events in the following circumstances: [traffic stops, pursuits, emergency response, and 
prisoner transport].”); CHICAGO POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERAS, SPECIAL ORDER S03-14 
(effective May 10, 2016) [hereinafter CHI. PD, ORDER S03-14], https://www.bwcscorecard.org/ 
static/policies/2016-05-10%20Chicago%20-$20BWC$20Policy.pdf (“Department members 
assigned a [Body Worn Camera]: will activate the system to event mode to record the entire 
incident for all . . . traffic stops. . . . foot and vehicle pursuits; emergency driving situations; 
high-risk situations . . . any encounter with the public that becomes adversarial after the 
initial contact; and any other instance when enforcing the law.”); BATON ROUGE POLICE DEP’T,
BODY WORN CAMERAS, No. 502/15-1 (eff. Apr. 23, 2015) (on file with author) (“Body Worn 
Camera Recorders shall be utilized to record the following types of events when safe to 
activate: . . . All Calls of Service, including backup Officers [and] Other legitimate law 
enforcement contacts.”); MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEP’T, POLICY & PROCEDURE MANUAL § 4-223 
(effective July 29, 2017), http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/policy/mp dpolicy_4-200_4-
200 (“Officers shall active their BWC for the following circumstances. . . . Any contact 
involving allegations of criminal activity . . . . Any use of force situation.  If a BWC is not 
activated prior to use of force, it shall be activated as soon as it is safe to do so.”). 
10 See, e.g., United States v. Daniel, No. 1:16 CR 6 SNLJ (ACL), 2016 WL 4004578, at *5 
(E.D. Mo. July 7, 2016) (“[A]ccording to Perryville Police Department policy the body camera 
should be used during interactions with suspects. . . . Officer James testified that he believed 
his body camera was on throughout the traffic stop, however, it turned out the recorder either 
hadn’t been turned on, it was not functioning, or he ‘possibly didn’t use it correctly.’ ”); 
Nashelly Chavez, Rocklin Officers Who Shot Former Honor Student Didn’t Turn on Body 
Cameras Until Later, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 3, 2017, 6:11 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/ne 
ws/local/crime/article136372438.html (did not record until after fatal shooting); Lynh Bui & 
Peter Hermann, Federal Officials Indict Seven Baltimore Police Officers on Racketeering,
WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2017), http://wapo.st/2lqLXSU (detailing charges against officers who 
allegedly extorted money from civilians, used or threatened force, and turned off their body 
cameras during the encounters); Kym Klass, Community Gathers to Remember Greg Gunn,
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (Ala.) (Feb. 26, 2017, 5:53 PM), http://on.gmadv.com/2lHxDsq 
(reporting that the officer failed to turn on his body camera during a stop and chase in which 
the officer beat, tased and then fatally shot Greg Gunn); Yihyun Jeong, Completed 
Investigation into Flagstaff Officer Punching Woman Sent to Coconino County Attorney, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Jan. 3, 2017, 2:18 PM), http://azc.cc/2LPrcle (reporting that an officer turned off his 
body camera during an encounter that involved the officer punching a woman); Alex Holloway, 
Ricky Ball Shooting: Officers Respond to Ball Lawsuit, COMMERCIAL DISPATCH (Columbus, 
Miss.) (Nov. 2, 2016, 10:48 AM), http://www.cdispatch.com/news/article.asp?aid=53932 
(reporting that an officer did not activate his body camera during a traffic stop in which the 
officer shot and killed Ricky Ball, a passenger). 
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What happens when key video evidence is missing, contrary to 
the police department’s own rules?  This Article illuminates the 
murky or absent internal checks on the growing problem of 
missing or partial recordings and proposes judicial remedies to 
supplement internal enforcement challenges.  This Article also 
explores the desirability of new technologies that automate the 
decision to record and reduce the risk of human error and 
noncompliance.  Presenting findings from the collection and coding 
of available major-city body camera policies, this Article reveals 
widespread enforcement gaps in body camera policies.11  More 
than half of body camera policies in this sample do not specify 
consequences for not recording as required.12  Many also have 
express limits regarding the mechanisms for detecting whether 
officers follow the recording rules.13  This Article discusses how 
police departments are constrained to address the challenges by 
labor laws and collective bargaining requirements.14  The issue is 
important from both adjudicative justice and public safety 
perspectives.  There is emerging evidence that wearing body 
cameras reduces the use of force among officers who follow the 
recording protocol, but increases among officers who wear body 
cameras and do not follow the rules.15   
In the activist arena, the ACLU of Massachusetts has proposed 
a “no tape, no testimony” rule in which courts would instruct juries 
to discredit or ignore the testimony of officers if the body camera 
recording is missing.16  Some state legislatures are also beginning 
                                                                                                                   
11 See infra Part II.B.
12 See infra Part II.B, Table 2. 
13 See infra Part II.B, Tables 1, 3, 4. 
14 See infra Part III.A.
15 See Barak Ariel et al., Report: Increases in Police Use of Force in the Presence of Body-
Worn Cameras Are Driven by Officer Discretion: A Protocol-Based Subgroup Analysis of Ten 
Randomized Experiments, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 453 (2016).  For a discussion 
of the findings, see infra text accompanying notes 84–86. 
16 See ACLU OF MASS. & SAMUELSON LAW, TECH. & PUB. POLICY CLINIC NO TAPE, NO
TESTIMONY 2 (2016) [hereinafter ACLU, NO TAPE, NO TESTIMONY], https://aclum.org/wp-con 
tent/uploads/2016/11/ACLU_BodyCameras_11.21_final.pdf (proposing an instruction that 
“would tell the jury that, if it finds that the police unreasonably failed to create or preserve 
a video of a police-civilian encounter, it can devalue an officer’s testimony and infer that the 
video would have helped the civilian. If the jury finds that the case involves bad faith, such 
as the outright sabotage of body cameras, then it should be instructed to disregard officer 
testimony altogether.”). 
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to search for approaches to address the problem.17  Reflecting the 
enduring focus on the criminal trial as the arena of primary 
contestation in criminal adjudication, early proposals focus on jury 
instructions regarding the testimony of officers who fail to record.18   
While the attention is salutary, the focus on jury instructions 
does not address the vast majority of criminal cases, that is, those 
which never make it to trial.  More than 90% of criminal 
convictions come from plea bargaining, never reaching the jury-
instructions phase of trial.19  According to the most recently 
available aggregated statistics, 97% of federal convictions,20 and 
94% of state felony convictions21 arise from please bargains.  As 
the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, “[b]ecause ours ‘is for the 
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials,’ it is 
insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a 
backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process.”22
Filling a gap, this Article focuses on pretrial remedies that can 
apply to the fuller swathe of criminal procedure cases.  This Article 
also concludes that remedies for missing video are just a stop-gap 
measure.  The optimal approach to the missing video problem is 
automatic activation to reduce the risk of human error and 
noncompliance. 
                                                                                                                   
17 See, e.g., H.B. 2737, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017) (making it a Class 3 
felony and a firing offense for an officer to knowingly fail to turn on or turn off an officer-
worn body camera contrary to departmental recording policy when there is a reasonable 
opportunity to comply); H.B. 1613, 2017 Sess. (Va. 2017) (providing that an officer who fails 
to record using the body camera as required may still testify about the events that should 
have been recorded, but the court should instruct the jury to consider the failure to record 
“in determining the weight given to [the officer’s] testimony,” or if there is no jury, then the 
court should consider the factor in weighing the testimony).  
18 E.g., H.B. 1613, 2017 Sess. (Va. 2017).  See generally ACLU, NO TAPE, NO TESTIMONY,
supra note 16 (proposing remedies focused on jury instructions and trial testimony). 
19 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl.5.22.2009 (2009), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5 
222009.pdf, cited in Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012). 
20 Of the 89,741 criminal defendants convicted and sentenced in U.S. District Courts in 
2010, 87,418 pled guilty or entered a plea of nolo contendere.  See DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE
tbl.5.22.2010 (2010), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf.  
21 See SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES, at 24 tbl.4.1 (2009), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf (reporting data on the types of felony 
convictions in state courts in 2006). 
22 Frye, 566 U.S. at 144 (citation omitted) (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 
(2012)). 
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The import of the body camera issue will only increase as more 
police departments deploy the cameras in order to rebuild public 
trust and to fulfill promises of accountability after national turmoil 
and protests in the wake of tragic police shootings.23  The strategy 
of surveilling the surveillors by using body cameras united an 
unusual coalition of civil rights and civil liberties groups and law 
enforcement leaders in support of the reforms.24  Body camera 
policies now call for recording more law enforcement activities 
than ever before, such as stops, frisks, searches, uses of force, 
responses to calls, and even consensual encounters in some 
jurisdictions.25  Controversial police activities that were formerly 
opaque, left to reconstruction in police-said, defendant-said 
credibility contests, are now supposed to be illuminated by a more 
objective record of what really happened.26
                                                                                                                   
23 See, e.g., Adam A. Marshall & Katie Townsend, Opinion, A Tool to Gain the Public’s 
Trust, WASH. POST (May 15, 2015), http://wapo.st/1Fj1zyJ (discussing the impetus for rapid 
department adoption of police-worn body cameras); Max Ehrenfreund, Body Cameras for 
Cops Could Be the Biggest Change to Come Out of the Ferguson Protests, WASH. POST:
WONKBLOG (Dec. 2, 2014), https://wapo.st/1tHTsl3 (reporting that, in response to incidents 
like the shooting of Michael Brown in Missouri, “body-worn cameras will be as ubiquitous in 
the world of policing as handcuffs” by 2019). 
24 See, e.g., Press Release, NAACP ET AL., Civil Rights Coalition Urges National Reforms 
and Recommendations to Address Police Abuse (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.naacp.org/latest/c 
ivil-rights-coalition-urges-national-reforms-and-recommendations-to-addres/ (calling for police 
to wear body cameras); Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law et al., A Unified 
Statement of Action to Promote Reform and Stop Police Abuse (Aug. 18, 2014), https://www. 
aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/black_leaders_joint_statement_-_final_-_8-18.pdf (a joint 
statement of multiple civil rights and civil liberties groups urging the adoption of police-worn 
body cameras); Maciag, supra note 8 (reporting on the widespread adoption of police-worn 
body cameras by departments around the nation). 
25 See Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 897, 932 (2017) [hereinafter Fan, Justice Visualized] (reporting findings on 
common contexts where body camera policies require recording). 
26 See, e.g., AUSTIN POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL, POLICY 303, at 128 (issued Sept. 28, 
2017), https://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/Police/APD_Policy_Manual.pdf 
(“The use of Body Worn Digital Recording (BWDR) system provides an unbiased audio/video 
recording of events that employees encounter.”); CHI. POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERAS,
Special Order S03-14, § I (effective June 9, 2017), https://directives.chicagopolice.org (search in 
search bar for “S03-14”; then follow “Body Worn Cameras” hyperlink) (stating that body-worn 
cameras can “improve the quality and reliability of investigations and increase transparency”); 
PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, BODY-WORN CAMERAS, DIRECTIVE 4.21, § 1 (issued Jan. 15, 2016, 
updated Jan. 27, 2017) [hereinafter PHILA. PD, BWC DIR.], http://www.phillypolice.com/asse 
ts/diretives/D4.21-BodyWornCameras.pdf (explaining that body-worn cameras “provide an 
unbiased audio and video recording of events that officers encounter”); Fan, Justice Visualized,
supra note 25, at 919–20 (discussing the imbalance of power and ability to speak in defendant- 
said, police-said credibility contests). 
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Yet, amid this revolution on paper, emerging reports from the 
field indicate that some body-worn cameras are disabled or turned 
off when they are supposed to be recording.27  Even when it comes 
to the more established technology of patrol car dash cameras, 
findings by Chicago police officials indicate that 80% of recordings 
fail to capture audio due to officer error or “intentional 
destruction.”28  Selective recording and non-recording poses the 
risk of subverting the promise that led communities across the 
nation to embrace more surveillance by police body cameras in 
exchange for improved accountability and transparency.29  If the 
problem is left unchecked, rather than being a tool of police 
accountability, body camera recordings could amplify the problems 
of a gross imbalance in power.  Video recordings can offer more 
powerful evidence to speed up a plea bargain or conviction or 
justify a search or seizure.30  But recordings that might exonerate 
or implicate officers are missing.31
                                                                                                                   
27 See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.  See also, e.g., Justin Fenton & Kevin 
Rector, 7 Officers Charged with Racketeering: Members of City Gun Task Force Accused of 
Robbing Civilians, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 2, 2017, 2017 WLNR 6558848 (reporting 
prosecutors’ allegations that seven Baltimore police officers who were indicted for 
racketeering turned off their body cameras before threatening civilians to extract 
payments); Tim Cushing, ACLU Suggests Jury Instructions Might Be A Fix For ‘Missing’ 
Body Camera Recordings, TECHDIRT, Dec. 3, 2016, 2016 WLNR 36979699 (“Body cameras 
are pretty much mainstream at this point, but when excessive force and/or misconduct are 
alleged, footage captured by police is often nonexistent. Officers disable recording 
equipment, delete footage, or simply claim the camera ‘malfunctioned.’  Some repeatedly 
‘forget’ to activate their cameras ahead of controversial arrests and interactions.”). 
28 Radley Balko, 80 Percent of Chicago PD Dash-Cam Videos are Missing Audio Due to 
‘Officer Error’ or ‘Intentional Destruction,’ WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2016), http://wapo.st/1nCW 
5d0. 
29 See, e.g., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-
WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 5 (2014) [hereinafter 
JUSTICE DEP’T BWC RECS.], http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/4720149121347152468 
69.pdf (discussing the accountability and transparency concerns that prompt police 
departments and communities to adopt police body cameras). 
30 See, e.g., State v. Herrin, No. 1 CA-CR 12-0141, 2012 WL 3233227, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
Aug. 9, 2012) (dash camera recording used to secure a felony conviction for resisting arrest); 
United States v. Bryant, No. 1:15CR99-1, 2015 WL 2248177, at *1, *5 (M.D.N.C. May 13, 
2015) (reviewing officer body camera footage and concluding that the defendant’s nervous 
demeanor helped justify the stop when the encounter was no longer consensual in nature), 
rev’d, 654 F. App’x 622 (4th Cir. 2016); State v. Gibbons, No. 2012-UP-177, 2012 WL 
10841329, at *1 (S.C. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2012) (recording of defendant’s arrest used to secure 
convictions for first-degree harassment and resisting arrest). 
31 See, e.g., Richardson v. Mahon, No. 4:15-cv-3317-RBH-TSR, 2017 WL 430862 
(S.D.S.C.), vacated on other grounds, 2017 WL 4262517 (4th Cir. Sept. 26, 2017) (alleging 
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Courts, as the central framers of criminal procedure rules and 
evidentiary gatekeepers, have an important role to play in 
deterring selective recording and non-recording and ensuring an 
accurate and fair evidentiary record.32  The challenge is how to 
fashion remedies that do not altogether deter judicial inquiry 
because they require collateral mini-trials on whether officers had 
legitimate reasons for not recording or whether they acted in bad 
faith.33  This Article proposes remedies flowing from a more 
administrable evidentiary fairness framework that spares courts 
from having to wade into the morass of individual blame before 
offering a remedy.34  Remedies that reflect this approach include 
excluding partial recordings and drawing favorable inferences for 
the defense.35  This Article also proposes drawing on the 
institutional capacity of courts as repositories of evidence and 
filings in order to detect patterns and practices of violations in 
need of redress.36  Finally, this Article discusses the desirability of 
deploying new technologies that automate the decision to record, 
reducing both the risk of human error or resistance and the need 
for judicial intervention.  
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part II frames the growing 
problem of the gap between the promise to record more police 
encounters than ever before and noncompliance on the ground.  
This part also discusses the widespread silence regarding 
sanctions in recording policies for failure to record.  Part III 
discusses why departments face difficulties disciplining officers for 
                                                                                                                   
that officer failed to record plaintiff’s arrest via body camera or dash camera though other 
officers said the events should have been recorded); United States v. Daniel, No. 1:16 CR 6 
SNLJ (ACC), 2016 WL 4004578, at *5 (E.D. Mo. July 7, 2016) (noting absence of the 
recording of key contested events despite policy which required recording via body camera).  
See also Tim Cushing, If Police Officials Won’t Hold Officers Accountable, More Cameras 
Will Never Mean More Recordings, TECHDIRT, Aug. 11, 2016, 2016 WLNR 24414477 
(discussing examples of police failures to record); examples cited, supra note 2–5, and 
discussion, infra Part II. 
32 See infra Part IV. 
33 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
34 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
35 See discussion infra Part IV.B.1–2.
36 See infra Part IV.B.3; see also Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward 
Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2051–54 (2016) 
(encouraging criminal courts to better utilize their specialized institutional knowledge of 
the criminal justice system in order to participate effectively in efforts “to reform the failed 
criminal justice state”).   
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failing to record as required or even specifying what, if any, 
sanctions apply.  Part IV argues that courts have an important 
role to play in addressing the missing-video problem and the 
incapacity of departments to self-police.  This part offers three 
pretrial remedies to incentivize compliance and ensure fair 
evidentiary use of the audiovisual record in criminal cases.  
Finally, Part V concludes by arguing that the optimal approach is 
to deploy new technologies that automate police-worn body camera 
recording, thus alleviating the missing video problem and the need 
for judicial intervention. 
II. AFTER THE RECORDING REVOLUTION: THE MISSING VIDEO 
PROBLEM
Revolutions offer grand promises of transformation that seize 
attention and tantalize the imagination.37  But the real impact—if 
any—of a revolution is determined in the messy days after the 
revolution, during the implementation of the promises.38  It is in 
implementation that promises come to fruition or go unrealized—
or even invert, offering the opposite of what people hoped.39  Now 
is the crucial time that will frame the real impact of the recording 
revolution in police regulation. 
Shaken by protests over police use of force, and recurrent 
deaths of young minority men, departments across the nation have 
promised to adopt body cameras to rebuild trust, address 
accusations, and promote accountability.40  The rapid shift since 
                                                                                                                   
37 See, e.g., Matt Viser & Annie Linsky, Grand Promises Stir Voter Passions, But Are Hard 
to Keep, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2016/01/25/do 
nald-trump-and-bernie-sanders-lead-pack-with-unrealistic-promises/CxkGiorOezl2d365xtQIg 
K/story.html (discussing the “pie-in-the-sky” policies 2016 presidential candidates Donald J. 
Trump and Bernie Sanders espoused during their respective campaigns). 
38 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 27, 72, 96 (1992) 
(discussing the challenges of implementing promises made during a revolution once “normal 
politics” has resumed in a post-revolution society). 
39 See id.
40 See, e.g., POLICE COMPLAINTS BD., ENHANCING POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH AN 
EFFECTIVE ON-BODY CAMERA PROGRAM FOR MPD OFFICERS 3–4 (2014), https://policecomplain 
ts.dc.gov/publication/enhancing-police-accountability-through-effective-body-camera-prog ram-
mpd-officers (follow “Attachment” hyperlink) (recommending that the District of Columbia 
Metropolitan Police Department utilize body-worn cameras to “reduce the incidence of 
complaint-generating events,” to foster a culture of respect between the police and the public, 
and to hold accountable those officers that have broken the law or department policy); JUSTICE 
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late 2014 has been remarkable.  In 2013, few departments had 
body cameras.41  Police officers had concerns over wearing the 
intrusive technology.42  Since the national protests over police 
killings, and calls by civil rights and civil liberties groups for police 
to wear body cameras, the vast majority of departments have 
announced plans to deploy the technology.43  Then-President 
Barack Obama’s announcement in late 2014 of plans to offer 
millions of dollars in grant funding for body cameras further fueled 
the scramble to adopt programs.44
On the books, recording policies seem to present a major 
transparency paradigm shift, mandating recording of most law 
enforcement activities such as stops, searches, arrests, uses of 
force, responses to calls, and more.45  On the ground, however, 
challenges involving the nonrecording or selective recording of 
police activities are emerging.46  This part presents the growing 
challenge of missing video after the body camera revolution and 
how recording policies often do not specify what, if any, sanctions 
apply.   
                                                                                                                   
DEP’T BWC RECS., supra note 29, at 6–7 (discussing the positive feedback from police 
departments regarding the use of body cameras). 
41 See, e.g., JUSTICE DEP’T BWC RECS., supra note 29, art. 2 (reporting that, in 2013, less 
than a quarter of the 254 police departments surveyed used body cameras). 
42 See Tami Abdollah, Officers’ Body Cameras Raise Privacy Concerns, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Mar. 15, 2014, WESTLAW (“[S]ome rank-and-file officers are worried [body cameras] 
might ultimately be used to derail their careers . . . .”); O’Ryan Johnson & Erin Smith, 
Concern on Both Sides: BPD Brass, Union Fear Cameras on Cops, BOS. HERALD, Dec. 4, 
2014, 2014 WLNR 34249221 (discussing the concerns of top Boston police officials that 
people in “crime-battered neighborhoods” might not want to speak with the police if they 
knew they were being recorded). 
43 See Maciag, supra note 8 (reporting that 95% of seventy police departments surveyed 
had plans to adopt or had adopted body cameras).
44 See DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2015) [hereinafter 
DENVER INDEP. MONITOR 2014 REPORT], http://extras.denverpost.com/Denver_Monitor_2014_ 
Annual_Report.pdf (“Many police chiefs . . . scrambled to announce BWC programs . . . after 
the President’s announcement.”); Carrie Dann & Andrew Rafferty, Obama Requests $263 
Million for Police Body Cameras, Training, NBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2014, 7:15 PM), http://www. 
nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/obama-requests-263-million-police-body-cameras-training-n25 
9161 (reporting that, in the wake of tragic police shootings, the Obama White House requested 
“$263 million in funding for police body cameras and training”). 
45 See Fan, Justice Visualized, supra note 25, at 932 (“Nearly all [police] departments 
mandate recording of Terry and traffic stops, searches, arrest, pursuits, and responses to 
calls for service.”). 
46 See discussion supra notes 3–10 and infra notes 47–77 and accompanying text. 
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A.  NEW CONTROVERSIES OVER RECURRING TRAGEDIES 
On a San Francisco street, sheriff’s deputies beat suspected 
auto thief Stanislav Petrov with metal batons, inflicting multiple 
head and arm injuries that required twelve days of 
hospitalization.47  Ten out of the eleven responding officers did not 
activate their body cameras.48   The eleventh officer’s body camera 
did activate—by accident.49  The incident came to light when 
residents, whose private security cameras captured the incident, 
gave the public defender’s office their recordings.50  At the time, 
the Alameda Sheriff’s Department policy encouraged sheriffs to 
use their body cameras to record, but did not mandate it.51  After 
the controversy over the case, the sheriff’s department revised its 
policy to require recording.52
Requiring recording of law enforcement activities is an 
increasingly prevalent approach.53  Is a policy mandate to record 
police encounters enough to address the failure to activate the 
body camera?  Controversies and findings from other jurisdictions 
suggest the answer is no.  Even in the growing number of 
jurisdictions where department policies require recording, some 
officers have not activated their body cameras or hit record only 
after the key event, such as a use of force or traffic stop.54   
Consider, for example, the experience of early departmental 
pioneers that piloted body cameras before the rush.  The Phoenix 
                                                                                                                   
47 See Dan Lawton, Alameda County Deputy Beating Prompts Change in Body Camera 
Policy, MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 29, 2016, 5:32 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/03/29/al 
ameda-county-deputy-beating-prompts-change-in-body-camera-policy/; Melanie Woodrow, 
Alameda County Deputy Beating Case Prompts Camera Policy Change, ABC7 NEWS (Mar. 29, 
2016), http://abc7news.com/news/alameda-county-deputy-beating-case-prompts-policy-change/  
1267601/. 
48 Gretel Kauffman, How Police Departments Are Ensuring the Use of Body Cameras,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 7, 2016, 2016 WLNR 24034840. 
49 Id.
50 California Deputies Charged in Beating Captured on Video, CBS NEWS (May 10, 2016, 
6:15 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/california-deputies-charged-in-beating-captured-on-vi 
deo/. 
51 See Lawton, supra note 47 (noting that, prior to the Petrov incident, it was “optional 
for deputies to turn on their cameras”). 
52 Id.
53 See Fan, Justice Visualized, supra note 25, at 932 tbl.2 (listing enforcement events and 
the number of surveyed departments that require recording of the event—most had adopted 
the mandatory recording of the police activities included in the survey). 
54 See infra notes 55–77. 
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Police Department body camera policy instructed officers that the 
“camera must be activated during all investigative or enforcement 
contacts, which includes traffic stops.55  Yet, a recent evaluation of 
the impact of body-worn cameras in the department found that a 
mere 6.5% of traffic stops were recorded.56  Officers were most 
likely to use their body cameras to record domestic violence calls,57
where the evidentiary value of recordings for prosecution are 
particularly crucial because victims frequently recant.58 Even 
then, less than half (47.5%) of domestic-violence incidents were 
recorded.59
As another police department ahead of the curve in piloting 
body cameras, the Denver Police Department’s results are also 
instructive.60  The department’s body camera policy required 
activation in numerous contexts, such as “[p]edestrian, citizen 
and/or vehicle contacts,” and “[a]ny encounter that becomes 
adversarial.”61  Yet, the Independent Monitor overseeing the 
department found that, during the six-month pilot program, only 
twenty-one of eighty uses of force were recorded by body-worn 
cameras—just 26% of such critical incidents.62  Unrecorded uses of 
force included incidents such as punching a suspect in the face, 
baton strikes, pushing, pepper-spraying, and tasing suspects.63
                                                                                                                   
55 PHOENIX POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN VIDEO TECHNOLOGY – PILOT, OPERATIONS ORDER
4.49, § 5 (effective Apr. 2013).  
56 CHARLES M. KATZ ET AL., ARIZ. STATE UNIV. CTR. FOR VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND CMTY.
SAFETY, EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF OFFICER WORN BODY CAMERAS IN THE PHOENIX POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 22 (2014), http://publicservice.asu.edu/sites/default/files/ppd_spi_feb_20_2015_fi 
nal.pdf. 
57 Id. at 22.     
58 See also SAN DIEGO POLICE DEP’T, AXON BODY WORN CAMERAS, PROCEDURE 1.49, § V 
(2015) [hereinafter SAN DIEGO PD, PROCEDURE 1.49], https://rcfp.org/bodycam_policies/CA/ 
SanDiegoBWCPolicy_update.pdf (“Domestic violence victims often recant their statements 
as early as the following morning after a crime. Some victims go so far as to testify that the 
officer fabricated their statement. Victims may also make their children unavailable for 
investigators or court to avoid their providing statements.”); Deborah Tuerkheimer, 
Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic Violence and the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1, 
14–16 (2006) (explaining that domestic violence victims frequently succumb to pressures 
from batterers and recant, refuse to testify, disappear, or refuse to press charges).  
59 KATZ ET AL., supra note 56, at 22. 
60 The Denver Police Department piloted body cameras beginning in June 2014.  See
DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 44, at 8. 
61 DENVER POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERA, POLICY 111.11, § 3 (finalized Sept. 1, 
2015), https://www.rcfp.org/bodycam_policies/CO/DenverCO_BWC_policy_update.pdf. 
62 DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 44, at 10. 
63 Id. at 13, 20, 24–25. 
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Some of the non-recording occurred because supervisors or off-duty 
officers were not required to wear body cameras at the time.64  Yet, 
even among officers who were patrolling on-duty and required to 
use body cameras, only 47% of the forty-five uses of force were 
recorded despite the rules.65   
While recording policy noncompliance rates are not available for 
many other departments, scandals and deaths are revealing 
problems.66  In Baltimore, an investigation into officers who 
allegedly used traffic stops, home entries, and false warrants to 
rob civilians also revealed how the officers would regularly turn off 
their body cameras during such encounters.67 Baltimore Police 
Department policy clearly and concisely mandates body camera 
activation during any “activity that is investigative or enforcement 
in nature” or “any encounter that becomes confrontational.”68 The
alleged behavior on the ground, if proven true, would be a mockery 
of the rules.  
In Chicago, the national controversy over the shooting of 
seventeen-year-old Laquan McDonald—and the missing audio from 
the five patrol car dash cameras at the scene—led to a departmental 
investigation.69  The investigation found that 80% of dash cameras 
had “no functioning audio.”70  Intentional destruction and officer 
error have contributed to the widespread problem.71  After a 
disciplinary crackdown that included random checks and 
punishment, the volume of video uploaded after each shift increased 
                                                                                                                   
64 Id. at 17–18. 
65 Id. at 17. 
66 See supra notes 3–10 and accompanying text. 
67 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Seven Baltimore City Police Officers Arrested for Abusing 
Power in Federal Racketeering Conspiracy (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-md/ 
pr/seven-baltimore-city-police-officers-arrested-abusing-power-federal-racketeering. 
68 BALTIMORE POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERAS PILOT PROGRAM POLICY 824 (effective 
Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/policies/2015-10-26%20Baltimore%20-$2 
0BWC%20Policy.pdf.  
69 See Jeremy Gorner, Nearly 2 Dozen Chicago Cops Disciplined for Faulty Dashboard 
Cameras, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 7, 2016, 6:56 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/ 
editorials/ct-chicago-police-disciplined-met-20160106-story.html (describing the discipline 
officers have received after the shooting as a result of investigations into officers’ use of 
dash-cams). 
70 Id.
71 See Balko, supra note 28 (reporting the various ways Chicago officers prevent dash-
cam audio from being recorded, including “stash[ing] microphones in their squad car glove 
boxes” and “pull[ing] out batteries”). 
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by 75%.72  But the national spotlight on missing video in Chicago 
did not end there. 
Responding to calls for transparency, the Chicago Police had 
expanded its body camera program when officers fatally shot 
eighteen-year-old Paul O’Neal after he crashed a stolen Jaguar 
into police cars and then ran away on foot.73  Chicago’s body 
camera policy calls for officers to record all foot and vehicle 
pursuits, emergency driving situations and “any other instance 
while enforcing the law,” among many enumerated contexts.74  But 
the officer who shot O’Neal did not activate his body camera and 
catch the crucial moments.75   
Chicago and Baltimore are hardly alone in the missing video 
controversy.  The problem is underscored by the nonrecording of 
fatal shootings in numerous other jurisdictions that have adopted 
body cameras, such as Flagstaff, Arizona; Rocklin, California; 
Columbus, Missouri; Charlotte, North Carolina; and Montgomery, 
Alabama.76  In San Diego, it was the unrecorded fatal shooting of 
police officers wearing body cameras that underscored the 
problem, and how the protection of police as well as civilian lives 
are at stake.77
Using technology to improve the behavior of the police and 
public seems like an elegant idea, drawing on the principles 
behind Jeremy Bentham’s famous Panopticon.78  The Panoptic 
ideal is that people behave better when they know they are being 
watched, deploying pervasive surveillance to induce self-policing of 
behavior.79  The challenge is that the Panopticon was a plan for 
                                                                                                                   
72 See Gorner, supra note 69. 
73 See Sweeney & Gorner, supra note 5. 
74 CHI. PD, ORDER S03-14, supra note 9, § II.A.2. 
75 Police believe the officer did not intentionally disable the body camera.  Rather, “the 
crash or the officer’s lack of experience operating the camera” were likely causes of the 
nonrecording.  See Sweeney & Gorner, supra note 5.  
76 See supra notes 3–10. 
77 Amanda Lee Myers, Fatal Police Shooting Highlights Inconsistent Body Cam Usage,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 6, 2016), https://apnews.com/13112c126c9642bdbb21a1db47b2873f. 
78 See Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and Police 
Regulation by Data-Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 102 (2012) [hereinafter Fan, 
Panopticism] (discussing the extension of Panoptic principles to police regulation).  
79 See Miran BožoviĀ, Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS 8, 
11–18 (Miran BožoviĀ ed., 1995) (summarizing Bentham’s idea for a Panopticon prison, 
where inmates would be situated around an opaque watchtower so they were constantly 
visible to guards). 
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controlling prisoners.80  Police officers are not prisoners, and the 
police have more power to resist panoptic control, as illustrated by 
the controversial cases of unrecorded use of force by officers 
wearing body cameras surfacing around the nation.81   
Failure to record perversely undermines the very public trust 
and safety goals that led communities across the nation to adopt 
body cameras.82  Early studies suggesting that body cameras 
reduce the use of force and complaints by citizens are oft-cited by 
people hoping for a technological fix to one of the most challenging 
problems of our times.83  Yet new findings suggest the situation is 
more complex.  
The first findings from the largest set of randomized controlled 
trials of the effectiveness of body cameras revealed that uses of 
force jumped by 71% among officers who did not follow the 
recording protocol and instead recorded at their discretion.84  In 
contrast, among officer who followed the protocol, the use of force 
decreased by 37% among body cameras wearers compared to 
controls.85  Adherence matters—and nonadherence by officers 
equipped with body cameras may be associated with perversely 
heightened risk.86  Addressing failure to record is thus important 
                                                                                                                   
80 See Fan, Panopticism, supra note 78, at 102 (“Bentham’s original conception 
envisioned facilitating more efficient and effective governance of prison inmates . . . .”).  
81 See supra notes 3–10, 47–77. 
82 See MICHAEL D. WHITE, POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE 
EVIDENCE 19 (2014), http://cvpcs.asu.edu/products/police-officer-body-worn-cameras-assessi 
ng-evidence (follow “Documents” hyperlink) (noting that body cameras “can demonstrate to 
the community that officers aim to act in a fair and just manner”).  
83 See Barak Ariel et al., The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and 
Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J. 
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 509 (2015) (reporting results from a Rialto, California trial 
finding that officers who did not wear body cameras had twice the incidence of uses of force 
compared to officers randomly selected to wear body cameras); KATZ  ET AL., supra note 56, 
at 33 (finding a 22.5% decline in complaints against officers in a precinct that tested body 
cameras during a time when complaints were rising in other precincts); WHITE, supra note 
82, at 17–18 (finding a decline in complaints against Mesa, Arizona, police officers after the 
introduction of body cameras); Wesley G. Jennings et al., Cops and Cameras: Officer 
Perceptions of the Use of Body-Worn Cameras in Law Enforcement, 42 J. CRIM. JUST. 549, 
550 (2014) (discussing a Mesa (Arizona) Police Department evaluation which found a 40% 
decline in complaints against officers and a 75% decrease in use of force incidents after the 
introduction of body cameras).
84 Ariel et al., supra note 15, at 459–61. 
85 Id.
86 See id. at 461 (suggesting that “the selective activation of cameras by police is a 
corollary to situations that are already escalating in aggression,” and that “activating a 
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to both public safety and public trust, and can help improve the 
accuracy of adjudicating contested events. 
B.  WHAT HAPPENS IF OFFICERS DON’T FOLLOW THE RECORDING 
RULES? 
What happens to officers who refuse or otherwise fail to record 
pursuant to their department’s body camera policy?  How do we 
even know if officers have cameras off when they are supposed to 
be recording?  These questions are important because, without the 
ability to assess and incentivize compliance, recording policies are 
fancy dress over the same recurring problem.  This section reports 
findings regarding nonrecording detection mechanisms and 
sanctions from the collection and coding of body camera policies 
from police departments serving the 100 largest cities in the 
United States. 
The author and a research team composed of research 
assistants and law librarians conducted online searches, 
supplemented by direct contact with police departments, to 
ascertain the body camera adoption status and availability of a 
policy.87  The team focused on the primary police department 
serving each municipal area, rather than specialized agencies such 
as the Highway Patrol, because the primary department generally 
has the broadest portfolio of activities.88  In the course of collecting 
the policies, the team found that as of late 2015—about a year 
after the call for body cameras by civil liberties and civil rights 
groups89 and the President90—eighty-eight of the one hundred 
major-city departments had either piloted or deployed body 
cameras, or at least had plans to do so.91  Through searches of 
public materials and requests to the departments, the team 
                                                                                                                   
camera during a tense situation may serve to increase the aggression of the citizen/suspect 
(and thus the officer)”). 
87 The author and research team have no external sources of funding or conflicts to report. 
88 See, e.g., David N. Falcone & L. Edward Wells, The County Sheriff as a Distinctive 
Policing Modality, 14 AM. J. POLICE 123, 123–26 (1995) (explaining distinctions between 
law enforcement agencies). 
89 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.  
90 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.  
91 See Fan, Justice Visualized, supra note 25, at 931 (reporting the findings).   
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collected and coded fifty-nine policies available as of December 
2016.92
This sample yielded diversity of region and city size.  The 
regions represented and city sizes ranged from more than 8.5 
million people in New York City to less than 250,000 people in 
cities such as Fremont, California; Gilbert, Arizona; Chesapeake, 
Virginia; and Madison, Wisconsin.93  Appendix A lists the fifty-
nine cities for which we collected and coded departmental body 
camera policies.  The fifty-nine-policy sample set is more than 
twice as large as the collection of twenty-three body camera 
policies mapped by the Brennan Center.94  It includes thirty-eight 
major cities not covered in that set, such as Atlanta, Boston, 
Cleveland, Houston, Miami, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and St. 
Louis.  The study also codes substantive positions beyond a simple 
yes or no—for example, the type of consequences for not activating 
one’s body camera, rather than just whether the policy has 
consequences.  This project thus builds upon and advances prior 
important work. 
The results reported here are based on the coding of variables 
addressing three clusters of key questions for the detection and 
enforcement of recording rule violations: 
(1) Reporting and other detection mechanisms.
What, if anything, does an officer have to do upon 
a failure to record pursuant to policy?  Are there 
other mechanisms for detecting failures to record 
as required? 
(2) Sanctions or other consequences.  What, if 
any, consequences are specified for a failure to 
record? 
(3) Officer protections against detection and 
discipline.  Do the policies contain provisions 
                                                                                                                   
92 Of the policies, seven were draft policies, while the vast majority were finalized to 
govern at least a pilot deployment in the field. 
93 For population size data, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE 
RESIDENT POPULATION FOR INCORPORATED PLACES OF 50,000 OR MORE, RANKED BY JULY 1,
2016 POPULATION: APRIL 1, 2010 to July 1, 2016, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableser 
vices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml. 
94 Police Body Camera Policies: Accountability, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 3, 2016), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/police-body-camera-policies-accountability. 
76  GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:57 
limiting the ability to detect violations of the 
recording requirements and/or the ability to 
impose discipline for violations? 
Codes for the main types of policy positions were generated 
through an iterative process, based on an evaluation of the 
provisions.95  The distribution of policy positions are summarized 
in Tables 1–4 below. 
                                                                                                                   
95 For background on policy coding, see, e.g., Charles Tremper et al., Measuring Law for 
Evaluation Research, 34 EVALUATION REV. 242, 252–55 (2010). 
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Table 1. Do Officers Have to Report Failures to Record? 
59 Major-City Police Department Policies* 




Must explain in report, activity 
log, or other memorandum or 
database (“in writing”) 
17 29% 
Must explain on camera, in 
writing, or both, and notify 
supervisor 
8 14% 
Must explain on camera and in 
writing 4 7% 
Must explain on camera only 1 2% 
Must notify supervisor only 1 2% 
Must be able to articulate reason 
for nonrecording but no reporting 
requirement 
1 2% 
Must explain early deactivation 
but no provision for failure to 
record altogether 
14 24%
No provision on reporting failures 
to record 11 19%
* Because these policies are not mutually exclusive and some 
agencies are represented in more than one category, the numbers will 
not sum to 59/100%. 
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Table 2. Consequences for Failure to Record 
59 Major-City Police Department Policies* 




Express provision that failure to 
record or noncompliance is subject 
to discipline 
9 15% 
Written reprimand on first violation, 
one fined day and officer usage audit 
on second, and formal disciplinary 
case on third with “severe” 
disciplinary action for “purposeful, 
flagrant or repeated violations” 
1 2% 
Failure to activate is deemed a 
violation if it is to commit a 
violation of law or policy 
1 2% 
Supervisors have discretion to use 
non-disciplinary sanctions  1 2% 
Counseling or training rather than 
discipline 4 7% 
Express provisions against
disciplinary consequences (with or 
without exceptions for repeated 
patterns or intentional violations) 
4 7%
No provision on consequences 35 59%
* Because these policies are not mutually exclusive, and some 
agencies are represented in more than one category, the numbers will 
not sum to 59/100%. 
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Table 3. Supervisorial Review or Compliance Audits 
59 Major-City Police Department Policies* 




Supervisors are required to 
regularly view a sample of 
recordings for compliance 
22 37% 
Audits for policy compliance 
authorized 20 34% 
Supervisor may view recordings 
generally 6 10% 
Supervisors may not use recordings 
for evaluation unless there is an 
adverse event trigger (e.g., citizen 
complaint, good cause) 
4 7% 
An adverse event and higher 
authorization are required for 
supervisor evaluation 
5 8% 
No provision for supervisor review  6 10% 
* Because these policies are not mutually exclusive, and some 
agencies are represented in more than one category, the numbers will 
not sum to 59/100%. 
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Table 4. Limits on Disciplinary Use of Recordings 
59 Major-City Police Department Policies* 




May not use recordings to search 
for violations without cause and/or 
no random review for disciplinary 
purposes 
11 19% 
Minor violations found in 
recordings should not be subject to 
discipline  
 10 17% 
Review of videos related to specific 
adverse event should focus only on 
that event and relevant recordings 
pertaining to it 
6 10% 
Internal Affairs or similar unit may 
not view recordings unless formal 
complaint, higher authorization or 
official investigation 
 2 3% 
* Because this table reports the prevalence of officer-protective 
positions, and not all policies have such provisions, the figures will not 
sum to 59/100%. 
As Table 1 reports, just over half of the sample of major-city 
policies (51%) have provisions on documenting failures to record 
via camera, in writing, or both.  To further strengthen detection, a 
few departments combine the documentation with supervisor 
notification.  Conversely, nearly half of the major-city departments 
do not require that officers document in some written or video 
record when and why they failed to record an event that required 
recording.  One department requires officers to notify a supervisor 
about the failure to record, but there is no documentation 
requirement.  Nearly a quarter of the departments (24%) require 
the officer to explain the reasons for early deactivation of the 
2017]         MISSING POLICE BODY CAMERA VIDEOS 81 
recording, but do not address the complete failure to record an 
event.
Auditing or supervisorial review of a sample of videos for 
compliance is an alternative method of detecting some forms of 
noncompliance with recording rules.96  Of the sample, 37% require 
supervisors to regularly review a sample of their officers’ 
recordings for policy compliance.  This strategy puts the burden of 
detection on supervisors.  It is more likely to catch issues with 
early termination of recording rather than nonrecording, because 
supervisors review what is recorded, rather than what is not 
recorded.  The San Diego Police Department has an additional 
strategy to address the challenge of detecting failures to record 
altogether.  Supervisors are required to see if “the number of 
enforcement contacts match up to the number of videos 
submitted.”97  Audits are another detection strategy.  The study 
reveals that, among the major-city departments, 34% authorize 
audits for compliance.  
A number of the major-city policies have protections against
supervisor review of recordings for evaluation and discipline 
purposes.  As Table 3 summarizes, 15% of the major-city 
departments limit supervisor review of recordings absent an 
adverse-event trigger such as a citizen complaint or use of force.  
In addition, some of those departments require higher 
authorization as well as an adverse event before supervisors may 
review videos.  As Table 4 shows, 19% of the policies have express 
provisions against the use of recordings to actively search for 
violations and/or prohibit random review of recordings for 
disciplinary purposes.  Ten percent of the policies specify that, 
even when an adverse event necessitates viewing the videos, the 
review should focus on the specific adverse event and recordings 
pertaining to it.  Another more prevalent protection, found in 17% 
of the policies, provides that minor violations documented in 
recordings should not be subject to discipline.   
The majority of the major-city policies (59%) lack any provisions 
regarding the consequences for failure to record.  Ten percent 
                                                                                                                   
96 Cf. Gorner, supra note 69 (describing the “random checks” by investigators to 
determine whether Chicago police officers were properly reporting issues with dashboard 
cameras to their supervisors).  
97 SAN DIEGO PD, PROCEDURE 1.49, supra note 57. 
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contain an express provision against disciplinary consequences.  
As for those policies that do address consequences, the most 
prevalent approach (15% of the sample) is a general warning that 
failure to record or noncompliance with the body-worn camera 
policy is subject to investigation and/or discipline.  The Denver 
Police Department—whose Independent Monitor wrote extensively 
about noncompliance and the need to specify sanctions98—is a 
notable exception because of its detailed schedule of sanctions for 
failures to record.99  Some departments (7%) even expressly tell 
officers that noncompliance with the body-worn camera recording 
policy will generally not result in disciplinary consequences.100
III. INTERNAL DEPARTMENTAL ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES
To satisfy calls for accountability, transparency, and better 
evidence, body camera policies are full of recording 
requirements.101  On paper, a transformation seems to be 
underway.  But recording rules that provide little incentive to 
comply is only a reform on paper.102  As the results reported in 
Part II.B reveal, the majority of major-city body camera policies 
that are publicly available are silent about the consequences for 
refusing to record as required.  Policies are somewhat stronger on 
strategies for reporting and detecting noncompliance, but, even 
then, omissions are widespread.103  Moreover, several major-city 
police department policies contain protections against the review 
and use of recordings for evaluation and disciplinary purposes.104
This policy landscape, with its enforcement gaps, is shaped by 
the major challenges that police leaders face in introducing an 
                                                                                                                   
98 See discussion, supra notes 60–65. 
99 See DENVER POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS MANUAL, BODY WORN CAMERA TECHNOLOGY,
POLICY 119.04, § 12 (effective Sept. 15, 2017) [hereinafter DENVER PD MANUAL] (listing 
sanctions for violating the body-worn camera policy, ranging from oral reprimands for the 
first violation in twelve-month period to “more severe disciplinary action” for “[p]urposeful, 
flagrant, or repeat[ ] violations”).  
100 See supra Table 2. 
101 See Fan, Justice Visualized, supra note 25, at 928–34 (discussing the results of study 
into the recording requirements of police departments). 
102 See, e.g., DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 44, at 30 (reporting that 
the failure to inform officers of possible sanctions for noncompliance with recording 
requirements may have contributed to the substantial number of failures to record). 
103 See supra Table 3. 
104 See supra Table 4. 
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intrusive change to how rank-and-file officers must operate.105
The internal enforcement challenges are inherent in the structure 
of police departments.  This section discusses two major challenges 
that render internal enforcement difficult and necessitate external 
intervention or “cover” to police leaders to effectuate change.  First 
is the management-labor relationship between those who are 
introducing and enforcing recording requirements and those who 
must bear the burdens.106  Labor laws and unions give line officers 
the power to resist or delay deployment of body cameras unless 
they have input on the recording rules.107  Second is the individual 
fault-based nature of the discipline process.108  Internal 
disciplinary processes entail navigating the blurry zone between 
important and legitimate reasons for omissions of recording and 
subversion or resistance.109   
A.  THE DISCIPLINE DILEMMA 
Police leaders adopting body cameras to rebuild public trust 
and allay controversies face a dilemma.  For cameras to produce 
the desired benefits of reducing uses of force and citizen 
complaints, officers must actually use the technology as 
directed.110  Consequences for rule violations are the usual 
strategy to incentivize compliance.111  The need to spell out 
consequences for noncompliance is no secret.  Indeed, the Bureau 
of Justice Assistance provides the following advice to police 
departments: 
A department’s policy should also clearly indicate what 
will happen to an officer who fails to activate a camera 
in circumstances where activation is required.  Will 
                                                                                                                   
105 See discussion infra notes 113–29. 
106 See discussion infra notes 113–29. 
107 See discussion infra notes 113–29. 
108 See discussion infra notes 140–65. 
109 See discussion infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2.
110 See Ariel et al., supra note 15, at 459–62 (arguing that body cameras “should remain 
on throughout the [officer’] entire shift,” and officers should not retain discretion to activate 
the devices). 
111 Compare Austin’s famous classical formulation of law as a command that a sovereign 
may enforce through the threat of a sanction.  JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF 
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 5 (Noonday Press 1954). 
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the officer be subject to discipline?  If so, how will he or 
she be disciplined?  The consequences for failure to 
activate as well as premature deactivation should be 
clearly stated.112
The problem is that spelling out sanctions is easier to recommend 
than to accomplish in practice.  Introducing body cameras requires 
buy-in from the ranks—and potentially court battles with the 
police union over the change in working conditions and whether 
recording rules must be collectively bargained.113  Under federal 
labor laws, collective bargaining with the workers’ union is 
required when the conditions imposed by management constitute a 
material change to the applicable labor contract secured through 
collective bargaining.114
Through this leverage, or the specter of it, police labor unions 
have successfully secured limits on the use of recordings for officer 
monitoring, evaluation and discipline.115  Sometimes, as in the 
                                                                                                                   
112 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, BODY-WORN CAMERA TOOLKIT: FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS 21 (2015), https://www.bja.gov/bwc/pdfs/bwc_faqs.pdf. 
113 See, e.g., Ben Conarck, Jacksonville Sheriff, Police Union Clash Over Body Camera Rules,
FLA. TIMES UNION (Jacksonville), Feb. 8, 2017, 2017 WLNR 6684923 (reporting on a dispute 
between the local police union and the sheriff over whether body camera rules are subject to 
mandatory collective bargaining); Brian Bakst, Maplewood Police Officers Challenge Body 
Camera Policy in Lawsuit, MPR NEWS (Minn.) (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www.mprnews.org/stor 
y/2016/11/21/maplewood-police-officers-challenge-body-camera-policy-lawsuit (reporting on 
lawsuit by police officers who objected to random audits of body camera recordings and argued 
that such provisions must be subject to collective bargaining); Jan Ransom, Boston Slow to 
Adopt Policing Innovations; Changes Stall as Unions Seek Role, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 5, 2016, 
2016 WLNR 27007841 (reporting on a court battle between a Boston police union and Boston 
Police Department management over the introduction of body cameras and whether rules 
should be subject to collective bargaining); Harry Bruinius, Why Police Are Pushing Back on 
Body Cameras, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 30, 2016, 2016 WLNR 26450977 (detailing 
lawsuits and debates involving police unions over the body camera issue); Brian Brus, Police 
Union Complaint Halts Body-Cam Test Program, J. REC. (Okla. City), June 15, 2016, 2016 
WLNR 18940773 (discussing how a lawsuit by an Oklahoma City police union put the City’s 
body camera program on hold); Andrew Blake, Body Cameras Spark Lawsuit Between Denver 
Cops, City Officials, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2015, 2015 WLNR 33002278 (discussing a lawsuit 
by a Denver police union seeking collective bargaining over body camera rules).   
114 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012) (describing the obligation to bargain collectively). 
115 See, e.g., Editorial, Draft Body-Camera Policy Places Police Union’s Concerns Over 
Public’s, OREGONIAN, June 24, 2016, at A16, 2016 WLNR 19464570 (discussing controversy 
over the closed-door negotiations of a body camera policy between the mayor and the police 
union that allegedly resulted in a dilution of accountability and transparency measures); 
Max Schanzenbach, Union Contracts Key to Reducing Police Misconduct, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 
24, 2015, at 17, 2015 WLNR 34864776 (discussing how unions have successfully used 
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case of the Seattle Police Department’s policy regarding its body 
camera pilot program, the influence of the union in securing 
protections against discipline for not recording is transparently 
described on the face of the policy: 
The Memorandum of Agreement between the City of 
Seattle and the Seattle Police Officers’ Guild outlines 
the scope of the program.  Pursuant to that agreement, 
there will be no discipline that follows from not 
recording a particular incident with BWV.116   
When police department management designs a body camera 
program and policy without union input, the entire program can 
derail.  For example, the Oklahoma City Department of Police had 
to halt its body-worn camera program after an arbitrator ruled 
that the rules regarding recording and review had to be negotiated 
with the police union as part of a collective bargaining 
agreement.117  The union supported body cameras to protect 
against false accusations but wanted the power to help frame the 
rules of recording and protections regarding supervisor review and 
compliance audits.118  A central concern raised by the union was 
the management’s policy allowing supervisors to review recordings 
                                                                                                                   
collective bargaining to resist body camera adoption by police departments and secure 
“binding arbitration for any significant disciplinary action taken against officers—a system 
stacked heavily in favor of police”).  
116 SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, SEATTLE POLICY MANUAL, BODY-WORN CAMERA PILOT PROGRAM,
POLICY 16.091 (effective Apr. 1, 2016).  The current version of the Seattle Police Department’s 
manual no longer includes the quoted language.  Instead, the manual provides for particular 
situations in which an officer will not be disciplined.  For example, a failure to record 
particularly sensitive or private interactions, such as interviews with victims of sexual 
assault, will not subject the officer to discipline.  See SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, SEATTLE POLICE 
MANUAL, POLICY 16.090-POL 1 (effective July 19, 2017) [hereinafter SEATTLE PD MANUAL], 
https://www.seattle.gov/policemanual/.  Furthermore, upon departmental review of body 
camera recordings, an officer will not be subject to discipline for “minor acts of misconduct 
unrelated to the original reason for viewing the video” including use of profanity or rudeness.  
See id. at POLICY 16.090-POL 2.  Unlike the provision in the 2015 version of Seattle’s manual, 
it is unclear from the policy itself whether the 2017 provisions were the result of collective 
bargaining. 
117 See Agreement Reached to Restart Police Department’s Body-Worn Camera Program,
US FED. NEWS, Nov. 29, 2016, WESTLAW.
118 See id.
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at any time.119  The union wanted a limit to prevent supervisors 
from going on “a fishing expedition.”120
Concerns over supervisors using recordings to hunt for 
violations and nickel-and-dime officers for minor issues is reflected 
in the number of protections addressing those concerns.121
Philadelphia’s body camera policy explains the underlying 
rationale: 
To effectively perform their duties, Officers must have 
a level of comfort in which minor disciplinary offenses 
recorded while performing their duties that would not 
otherwise become known but for wearing a Body-Worn 
Camera, will not adversely affect an officer’s 
career. . . .  Thus, the secondary purpose of this 
directive is to provide officers with the knowledge that 
“minor disciplinary code violations” that are captured 
on any Body Worn Camera will not result in an official 
Internal Affairs investigation . . . based solely upon 
their minor infraction.122
The proposed draft of the New York body camera policy offers 
examples of “nickel-and-diming” concerns, “such as chewing gum 
or taking off a hat that the supervisor wouldn’t have otherwise 
seen.”123  Beyond sweating the small stuff, the larger concern is 
increased supervisor surveillance enabled by the availability of 
records.  For example, Saint Paul’s policy explicitly addresses the 
                                                                                                                   
119 See Sheldra Brigham, OKCPD Removes Body Cameras until Policy is in Place, KFOR
NEWS CHANNEL 4 (June 15, 2016, 7:14 PM), http://kfor.com/2016/06/15/okcpd-removes-body-
cameras-until-policy-is-in-place/.
120 See id. (quoting union president John George, “We didn’t want supervisors just to be 
able to go on a fishing expedition”). 
121 See supra Part II.B & Table 4 (finding that 17% of major-city police department policies 
involved limits on disciplinary use of recordings in cases of minor violations). 
122 PHILA. PD, BWC DIR., supra note 26, § 2.B.
123 N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS ORDER DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT 10 (June 29, 2016) 
[hereinafter NYPD, DRAFT OPERATIONS ORDER], https://policingproject.org/wp-consent/upload 
s/2016/06/NYPD-BWC-Draft-Policy.pdf; see also SEATTLE PD MANUAL, supra note 116, at 
POLICY 16.090-POL 2 (discussing examples of minor infractions, such as uniform infractions). 
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issue, providing: “Supervisors may not access or review BWC 
Data for the purpose of surveillance of any employee.”124
The omissions, gaps, and limits on review and discipline must 
be viewed in the structural context of police departments and 
labor’s concerns regarding management.  When a police 
department announces a plan to adopt body cameras, that does not 
mean that the officers who will actually be wearing the cameras 
support the endeavor.  For example, when the Boston Police 
Department sought 100 volunteers to pilot the technology, not a 
single person on the force of more than 2,000 sworn officers 
volunteered.125  The department had to conscript the 100 testers, 
whose union then sued, alleging labor law violations.126
Management has a delicate task securing buy-in from officers.127
Launching even a small pilot program is hard enough.128
Specifying consequences for noncompliance risks rousing 
organized resistance that would altogether defeat the project.129   
An external power may have more success in putting teeth into 
recording policies—or providing cover to police management to do 
so.130  It is noteworthy that the department in the sample with a 
detailed scale of sanctions—and among the toughest sanctions—
for non-recording was the Denver Police Department.131  Since 
2005, the Office of the Independent Monitor has served as a public 
                                                                                                                   
124 ST. PAUL POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERA PILOT POLICY, POLICY 442.18 (issued Oct. 
25, 2016, revised Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.stpaul.gov/books/44218-body-worn-camera-pi 
lot-policy. 
125 Editorial, Patience on ‘Pilot’, BOS. HERALD, Dec. 20, 2016, at 20, 2016 WLNR 38936566, 
http://www.bostonherald.com/opinion/editorials/2016/12/editorial_patience_on_pilot.  
126 Michael Levenson & Evan Allen, Boston Police Union Challenges Body Camera 
Program, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 26 2016, 2016 WLNR 26144946 (“[W]hen no officers 
volunteered to wear cameras, [the police commissioner] announced the department would 
effectively force 100 officers to wear the devices. . . . The [police] union [subsequently] filed a 
grievance . . . .”).  
127 For numerous examples of the court battles with police unions over the introduction of 
body cameras, see supra note 113. 
128 See sources cited supra note 113. 
129 See, e.g., Liam Dillon, Police Access Bills No Longer a Priority, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 
2017, at 1, 2017 WLNR 6287355 (discussing “steadfast” union opposition on discipline 
issues and successful fights by police unions). 
130 Cf. Shirin Sinnar, Institutionalizing Rights in the National Security Executive, 50 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 336–37 (2015) (noting that in the legislative context “[a]n 
external reviewer’s report might supply political cover for sympathetic but risk-averse 
lawmakers to press for reform”). 
131 See DENVER PD MANUAL, supra note 99, at POLICY 119.04, § 12.
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watchdog over the Denver Police Department.132  Created by 
ordinance passed by the City Council in 2004, the Independent 
Monitor has the power to monitor police conduct, investigate, and 
recommend changes in practices.133  In 2014, following the Denver 
Police Department’s pilot-test of police body cameras, the 
Independent Monitor released a report finding that many uses of 
force were not recorded on camera.134  The Independent Monitor 
noted that the failure to inform officers of possible sanctions for 
noncompliance may have contributed to the failures to record 
despite policy mandates.135
Drafted subsequent to the Independent Monitor’s report, 
Denver’s current body camera policy is now among the most 
detailed and toughest on sanctions among all the available major-
city policies analyzed.  Denver’s policy provides for an oral 
reprimand, together with a mandated officer review of the body 
camera policy, a follow-up meeting with a supervisor, and a 
“[j]ournal entry” for a first violation in a 12-month period; a 
written reprimand for a second violation in a 12-month period; and 
“1 fined day” for the third violation in a 12-month period.136  In 
addition, upon a second violation, the officer is subject to “an in-
depth audit of the officer’s data usage” and the resulting 
documentation goes to the Professional Standards Unit, which 
“will generate a formal Personal Assessment System (PAS) 
review.”137  In addition to this scale of penalties, the policy 
cautions that “[p]urposeful, flagrant or repeated violations will 
                                                                                                                   
132 See OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, COMPLAINT MONITORING GUIDELINES: EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 1 (2010), https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/374/docume 
nts/OIM_Case_Handling_Guidelines_Final_Executive_Summary_8_1_10.pdf (“In 2005, in 
an effort to improve police accountability to the public, the City of Denver created the Office 
of the Independent Monitor (OIM) . . . to monitor and report on the handling of citizen 
complaints by the Denver Police and Sheriff Departments.”). 
133 DENVER, COLO., REV. MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 2, art. XVII, § 2371.  See also Noelle 
Phillips, Move to Strengthen Denver’s Independent Monitor Advances, DENVER POST (Feb. 3, 
2015, 9:57 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/2015/02/03/move-to-strengthen-denvers-indepe 
ndent-monitor-advances/ (discussing a dispute between the Monitor and the Denver Police 
Department over whether the Department is obligated to grant full access to body camera 
footage for the Monitor). 
134 See discussion supra at notes 60–65. 
135 See DENVER INDEP. MONITOR 2014 REPORT, supra note 44, at 30. 
136 DENVER PD MANUAL, supra note 99, at POLICY 119.04, § 12.
137 Id.
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result in more severe disciplinary action.”138  These tough and 
detailed provisions contrast sharply with the majority approach of 
simply not addressing the consequences for noncompliance with 
recording directives.139
B.  PARSING BETWEEN LEGITIMATE CHALLENGES AND SUBVERSION 
Another important reason for the widespread omissions 
regarding consequences for failures to record is the difficulty of 
distinguishing legitimate from culpable conduct.  The commentary 
to the New York Police Department’s draft body camera policy 
openly acknowledges that sanctions are unspecified because of the 
difficulties: “Officer discipline is generally not mentioned in the 
proposed policy.  It is difficult to specify a discipline system as 
there are many variables that determine whether or not an officer 
should face discipline in [a] specific instance.”140  As the drafters of 
the New York policy frankly address, silence regarding whether 
sanctions will occur is no oversight.  It is easier to leave things 
unspecified because there are good reasons not to record.  Two of 
the major and commonly occurring justifications for failures to 
record are the need to respond to exigencies in the field and 
technological malfunction.  As discussed below, parsing between 
these important and legitimate justifications and refusal, 
resistance, and subversion is a delicate and difficult task. 
1.  Forgot in the Heat of the Moment, or Refused to Record?  In 
the cool and safe remove of hindsight, it is all too easy to question 
and condemn imperfect adherence, especially after a tragedy.141
But in the heat and fray of the field there are legitimate reasons 
why recording fails.142  Officers focused on the immediate need to 
respond to the exigencies of fast-unfolding and high-stress events 
                                                                                                                   
138 Id.
139 See supra Table 4. 
140 NYPD, DRAFT OPERATIONS ORDER, supra note 123, at 10. 
141 Indeed, “we tend to be historical simplifiers, even reducers, who often skate over the 
relevant facts in order to lay the blame somewhere rather than everywhere or nowhere.”  
MARK FREEMAN, HINDSIGHT: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF LOOKING BACKWARD 40 (2010). 
142 See discussion infra at notes 143–44, 152–57.  Cf. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 
U.S. 318, 346–47 (2001) (explaining that police officers frequently have to act “on the spur 
(and in the heat) of the moment”). 
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may forget to hit record, or lack the time to do so.143  Among body 
camera policies, there is wide and express acceptance of the basic 
proposition that safety trumps the recording obligation in body 
camera policies.144   
Inexperience with implementing new recording requirements 
can further lead to failures to record in stressful situations.145
Mistakes happen.  There is a learning curve with new technologies 
and procedures.146  The lack of a clear and calibrated scale of 
sanctions can even potentially end up underprotecting officers who 
face high-stress circumstances and a new recording regime.  For 
example, if a tragedy happens on an officer’s watch, and the 
incident hits the headlines, there is a risk of swift and severe 
sanctions in response to the attention, since no specified scale is 
                                                                                                                   
143 See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984) (“In a kaleidoscopic 
situation[,] . . . spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is necessarily the 
order of the day . . . .”). 
144 See, e.g., CORPUS CHRISTI POLICE DEP’T, MOBILE DIGITAL VIDEO RECORDING SYSTEMS 
AND BODY WORN CAMERAS, POLICY 303, at 7 (May 10, 2016) (on file with author) (“At no time 
is a member expected to jeopardize his/her safety in order to activate a BWC or change the 
recording media.”); MILWAUKEE POLICE DEP’T, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE, POLICY
747.25 (effective July 15, 2016), http://city.milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/Groups/mpdAuthors/ 
SOP/747-BODYWORNCAMERABWC1.pdf (“The department recognizes that officer safety is 
paramount.  Members with BWC who arrive on a scene or engage in an enforcement contact 
must start recording as soon as it is safe and practical to do so.”); NYPD, DRAFT OPERATIONS 
ORDER, supra note 123, at 3 (“If the circumstances require a[ ] [uniform member of the service] 
to engage immediate safety measures first, the [uniformed member] should do so and then 
activate the BWC as soon as it is practical and safe.  At no point should proper tactics be 
compromised to begin a recording.”); SAN DIEGO POLICE DEP’T, AXON BODY WORN CAMERAS,
PROCEDURE, PROCEDURE 1.49, at 2 (effective July 20, 2016) [hereinafter SAN JOSE PD, BWC
POLICY], https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/ 149.pdf (“Officer safety and public safety 
take precedence over recording events. . . . Officer safety and the safety of the public shall be 
the primary considerations when contacting citizens or conducting vehicle stops, not the 
ability to record an event.”); SAN JOSE POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY, at 2 
(effective July 29, 2015), http://www.sjpd.org/InsideSJPD/BodyCameras/SJPD_BWC_Policy_0 
6-29-15_with_POA_approval.pdf (“The safety of officers and members of the public is the 
highest priority, and the Department acknowledges there may be situations in which 
operation of the device is impractical or may be an impediment to public and officer safety.  
Additionally, the Department recognizes human performance limitations during particularly 
stressful, critical situations.”). 
145 See Sweeney & Gorner, supra note 5 (reporting findings of a preliminary investigation 
that officers’ inexperience with operating body cameras led to a failure to record the police 
shooting of Paul O’Neal).  
146 See, e.g., SAN DIEGO PD, BWC POLICY, supra note 144, at 1 (“There is also a learning 
curve that comes with using body-worn cameras.”).    
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set.147  Under the hot scrutiny of public attention after a tragedy, 
as people search for a villain to blame, officers’ claims about 
mistakes and exigencies may face withering skepticism.148
Yet the very import and power of the safety and high-stress 
justification creates the risk of it becoming a blanket and 
standard-form invocation.  This is a particularly acute risk in the 
cases that do not make the national news—the tasings, the pepper 
sprays, and the baton strikes that go unrecorded and without a 
fatality to draw media attention.149  For example, the Independent 
Monitor for the Denver Police Department observed that, in a 
number of unrecorded uses of force, the “officers asserted that the 
situations evolved too rapidly or were too volatile to permit BWC 
activation, even though it was the officers who initiated the 
contacts without first activating their BWCs, as required.”150
Parsing between these legitimate realities and circumvention, or 
just outright refusal to activate the body camera, calls for expert 
judgment and inference when confronted with uncertainties.   
2.  Technological Malfunction or Circumvention?  Technological 
solutions are alluring because they seem to free us from human 
fallibility.151  Yet, as anyone who has pounded multiple keys of a 
frozen laptop or had a cell phone die knows, technology has its own 
                                                                                                                   
147 Cf., e.g., Jeffrey Standen, The End of the Era of Sentencing Guidelines: Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 87 IOWA L. REV. 775, 805 (2002) (discussing how penalties that are clearly 
articulated in advance protect against the risk of more severe penalties); Elizabeth Szockyj, 
Imprisoning White-Collar Criminals?, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 485, 492–93 (1999) (discussing the 
role of media attention in raising the probability of punishment in the white-collar crime 
context). 
148 See Thomas E. Drabek & Enrico L. Quarantelli, Scapegoats, Villains, and Disasters, 4 
TRANS-ACTION 12, 12–16 (1967) (discussing the phenomenon of public scapegoating and 
villain-seeking after tragedies). 
149 See discussion, supra notes 62–65. 
150 DENVER INDEP. MONITOR 2014 REPORT, supra note 44, at 20.
151 The greater freedom from human fallibility that technology affords has spurred 
excitement and innovation in diverse quarters.  See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Dredging Up the 
Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and Surveillance, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 50–51 (2008) (discussing 
technological advances in response to fallible human memory which would “enable 
unprecedented accurate retention and recall”); Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: 
Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 199, 221–23 (2007) (discussing 
technological advances in automated law enforcement programs).  This allure can be 
misleading, however, compelling courts to adopt safety measures to prevent misleading 
jurors.  See, e.g., Reese v. Stroh, 874 P.2d 200, 205 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing 
standards for the admission of evidence which were “adopted to prevent the use 
of . . . technologies that, because they are mechanical or mysterious, appear infallible to the 
average juror”).  
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particular and manifold fallibilities.  Batteries die, devices freeze, 
fall, or otherwise fail.152  In the early days of dash cameras, 
departments who adopted the then-new and enticing technology 
soon discovered the many ways cameras and technology can 
deliver glitches.153
Accounts of malfunctioning body cameras are already 
emerging.154  Halfway into a six-month pilot program, the Boston 
Police Department experienced seventy-two recording failures 
with their body cameras.155  The Department attributed those 
failures to “technical malfunctions includ[ing] insufficient battery 
life, cameras falling off their mounts, or shutting off without 
explanation.”156  Clearly it would be unjust to punish officers for 
the fallibilities of technology, particularly when performing under 
high-stress, suboptimal field conditions.  Yet parsing between the 
vulnerabilities of technology and the subversion of resistant 
officers can be tough.   
Consider, for example, the claims by two Baton Rouge police 
officers that both their body cameras fell off during the tragic 
shooting of Alton Sterling.157  Sterling was selling CDs outside a 
convenience store when a homeless man persistently sought 
                                                                                                                   
152 See discussion infra notes 154–56. 
153 See Tom Casady, Hidden Cost of Body-Worn Cameras, DIRECTOR’S DESK (Oct. 31, 2014, 
6:12 AM), http://lpd304.blogspot.com/2014/10/hidden-cost-of-body-worn-cameras.html 
(discussing frequent technological malfunctions in the early days of dash camera adoption). 
154 See, e.g., Adam Randall, Norman Gary Family Hoping for Indictment in Grand Jury’s 
First Day, GOSHEN NEWS (Goshen, Ind.), Feb. 28, 2017, 2017 WLNR 6249535 (discussing 
police department reports of widespread body camera malfunctions one of which resulted in 
a failure to record a fatal shooting); Bob Blake, Family of Man Shot and Killed Files Civil 
Rights Lawsuit Against Elkhart Police Officers, S. BEND TRIB. (Ind.), Jan. 25, 2017, 2017 
WLNR 2549264 (chronicling controversies over body camera malfunctions and suspension 
of a body camera program, due to frequent technical problems); Samantha Vicent, 
Tahlequah Police Release Video from Officer-Involved Fatal Shooting, TULSA WORLD
(Okla.), Aug. 20, 2016, 2016 WLNR 25518803 (discussing body camera malfunction and 
memory capacity problems); Greg Moran, Officer’s Statements Conflict on Weapon, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2015, at 3, 2015 WLNR 38209020 (reporting on officer’s claim that body 
camera was not working at the time of a shooting and “it had been malfunctioning for 
several weeks”). 
155 Brian Dowling & Owen Boss, Critics Slam Cop Body Cams on the Link, BOS. HERALD,
Dec. 19, 2016, at 2, 2016 WLNR 38826283. 
156 Id.
157 See Kelly et al., supra note 3.  
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money from him.158  Finally, Sterling said, “I told you to leave me 
alone,” and showed the panhandler his gun.159  The homeless man 
then called 911 on his cell phone, telling police there was a man 
with a gun at the store.160  What happened next was captured on 
the cell phone camera of a bystander and a store camera but the 
officers’ body cameras failed to obtain usable footage of the 
incident.161   
Experts disagree on the likelihood that both cameras were 
dislodged around the same time.162  Some opined for the media 
that it would be highly unlikely for two cameras to both fall off at 
the same time-critical juncture.163  Yet others said it could happen 
and, in fact, it has happened before.164  Tod Burke, a professor of 
criminal justice and former police officer, argued that the highly 
unusual scenario would be for two officers to collude to prevent the 
recording of an incident whilst in the middle of a high-stress 
situation.165  The battle of the experts that played out in the media 
demonstrates how potentially time- and resource-consuming it 
would be to parse between officer subversion and technological 
malfunction in determining whether discipline is justified or not. 
                                                                                                                   
158 See Joshua Berlinger et al., Alton Sterling Shooting: Homeless Man Made 911 Call, 




161 Id.; Richard Fausset et al., Alton Sterling Shooting in Baton Rouge Prompts Justice 
Dept. Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/us/alto 
n-sterling-baton-rouge-shooting.html. 
162 See Frumin, supra note 3 (“Critics say [the officers’] explanation is awfully 
convenient—and arguably untrue.”). 
163 See, e.g., id. (quoting Steve Tuttle, a spokesman for Taser, “[i]t’s not unheard of, but it’s 
very unusual in the overall industry and certainly isn’t a significant issue for us despite 
seven years of our cameras being worn by more than 3,500 law enforcement agencies”). 
164 See id. (quoting law enforcement officials as stating that “it is entirely possible that 
both cameras could have fallen off,” and reporting that the Salt Lake City Police 
Department had “seen it happen when two officers are engaged with a person”). 
165 See id. (“It would have been a very, very unusual circumstance where both officers 
would have to say let’s turn it off and throw our body cameras away.  Everything seemed to 
happen relatively quickly.”). 
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IV. JUDICIAL PRETRIAL REMEDIES FROM AN EVIDENTIARY 
FAIRNESS PERSPECTIVE
Given the internal enforcement challenges and the reporting 
and incentives gaps in departmental recording policies, judicial 
remedies are especially important.  Courts have long been the 
most critical external actor in regulating police power.166  Courts 
are also the seasoned gatekeepers of evidence.167  This dual judicial 
role and level of expertise are important for addressing the 
missing video problem.  The challenge is how to frame 
administrable remedies that reduce the risk of perverse 
consequences posed by costly inquests into whether individual 
officers are to blame for missing video.168  This section proposes 
adopting an evidentiary fairness approach that does not depend on 
messy and costly culpability assessments and offers three 
remedies designed from such a perspective. 
A.  THE ADVANTAGES OF MAKING CULPABILITY IRRELEVANT 
Defendants do not fare well when they have to show bad faith 
on the part of the government for missing evidence.169  This is an 
approach with a low probability of success for at least three main 
reasons.  First, officers are unlikely to say they acted in bad faith 
and, in defendant-said, police-said credibility contests, officers are 
more likely to be believed.170  Second, courts are reluctant to find 
                                                                                                                   
166 See Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court’s Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Procedure, 43 
CONN. L. REV. 1, 48–76 (2010) (chronicling the rise of courts’ central role in regulating the 
police); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two 
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2471–2503 (1996) (discussing the central 
role of courts in framing conduct rules for the police). 
167 See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 147 (1999) (discussing the 
courts’ central gatekeeper role on evidentiary issues); Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the 
Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert 
World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 434 (2001) (“[J]udges are central and active figures in 
admissibility decision-making . . . .”). 
168 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
169 See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 72 F.3d 1444, 1452 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding the 
defendant failed to show bad faith on the part of the government in destroying video 
evidence); United States v. Valentin, 2016 WL 1296854, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2016) 
(ruling the defendant failed to show that the missing video was as a result of bad faith on 
the part of the government); Burks v. Howes, No. 08-12825-BC, 2010 WL 2772432, at *4 
(E.D. Mich. July 13, 2010) (same). 
170 See discussion infra notes 173–79. 
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that officers are “testilying,” even when they suspect this may be 
the case.171  Lastly, courts are reluctant to engage in costly mini-
trials on collateral evidentiary issues.172
As a systemic matter in criminal justice, credibility contests 
between defense allegations and police testimony are highly 
uneven and messy.173  Absent additional evidence beyond 
competing testimony, stories can diverge widely, with each side 
accusing the other of lying rather than merely mistaken.174
Defendants often allege that the police abused their power and 
perjured themselves to hide their civil rights violations.175  The 
police say the defendant is lying to avoid and subvert just 
punishment.176   
The playing field in this ugly battle is highly imbalanced.  To 
preserve their Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent and 
reduce the risk of generating impeachment material, defendants 
have strong incentives to remain silent rather than testify, even at 
pretrial motion hearings.177  This renders claims proffered in 
motions seem all the more unsubstantiated.  Furthermore, 
defendants are viewed as having a severe credibility problem—
                                                                                                                   
171 See discussion infra notes 180–82. 
172 See discussion infra notes 183–86. 
173 See Fan, Justice Visualized, supra note 25, at 913–20 (discussing the one-sidedness 
and ugliness of credibility contests). 
174 See id.
175 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sparks, 746 N.E.2d 133, 138 (Mass. 2001) (noting 
defendant’s allegations that police planted a knife in defendant’s bedroom during the 
execution of a search warrant); State v. Pogue, 17 P.3d 1272, 1273 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) 
(noting “[defendant’s] insinuation that the police planted the drugs”); People v. McGirt, 603 
N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (noting defendant’s allegations that “the 
police . . . planted evidence on him”); cf. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Three Former 
Atlanta Police Officers Sentenced to Prison in Fatal Shooting of Elderly Atlanta Woman 
(Feb. 24, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-former-atlanta-police-officers-sentence 
d-prison-fatal-shooting-elderly-atlanta-woman (quoting U.S. Attorney David E. Nahmias, 
“As Atlanta police narcotics officers, these three defendants repeatedly failed to follow 
proper procedures and then lied under oath to obtain search warrants.  Their routine 
violations of the Fourth Amendment led to the death of an innocent citizen.”). 
176 See Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75 
CALIF. L. REV. 1665, 1695 (1987) (discussing the credibility deficit defendants face). 
177 See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1449, 1449–50 (2005) (explaining that defendants are “encouraged to be quiet” 
through the criminal process). 
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after all, they are charged with a crime.178  Historically, 
defendants were not even deemed qualified to testify under 
oath.179
Moreover, judges are highly reluctant to openly discredit the 
testimony of law enforcement officers.180  Even when judges find 
an officer’s account questionable, the judge is keenly aware that an 
adverse finding suggesting that the officer is a liar can destroy the 
officer’s career.181  In a criminal justice system where judges are 
likely to see regularly officers from the jurisdiction’s agency in 
court and in chambers—and perhaps even need law enforcement 
endorsements to get re-elected—there are powerful systemic 
pressures against discrediting officers.182   
Finally, courts are also reluctant to engage in costly collateral 
mini-trials on evidentiary questions.183  In the context of recording 
technology, when the proffered reason may be technological 
malfunction, such inquests would be even more costly, perhaps 
                                                                                                                   
178 See Dripps, supra note 176, at 1695 (asserting that a criminal charge imposes a powerful 
incentive to offer exculpatory (and often perjured) testimony and “[b]ecause of this incentive, 
the trier of fact is likely to discount any exculpatory testimony given by the accused”). 
179 See Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 66 (2000) (citing 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 579 
(3d ed. 1940)) (noting eighteenth-century courts did not consider a defendant’s testimony at 
trial to be evidence, “since they were disqualified from testifying under oath”). 
180 See Morgan Cloud, Judges, “Testilying,” and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341, 
1352 (1996) (quoting THE N.Y.C. COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE 
CORRUPTION AND THE CITY’S ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES, COMMISSION REPORT 36 
(1994) (on file with the Georgia Law Review)) (“On the word of a police officer alone a grand 
jury may indict, a trial jury may convict, and a judge pass sentence.”); Christopher Slobogin, 
Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1047–48 & 
n.51 (1996) (suggesting that some judges might ignore perjury to achieve what the judge 
considers to be justice under the given circumstances of the case). 
181 Slobogin, supra note 180, at 1045 (noting that, although “judges believe perjury is 
systematic,” they are rarely sure enough that it is occurring to expose a police officer to 
criminal charges). 
182 See Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L. REV.
1391, 1391 (2001) (discussing law enforcement endorsements in judicial elections).  
183 See, e.g., United States v. Hurst, 185 F. App’x 133, 136–37 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing 
evidentiary rules that serve to avoid mini-trials on collateral matters); United States v. 
Bullock, 94 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing courts’ reluctance to engage in collateral 
mini-trials on an officer’s past traffic stops, as “[f]ocusing on such collateral matters would 
unduly encumber the court’s proceedings”); United States v. Talamante, 981 F.2d 1153, 1156 
n.5 (10th Cir. 1992) (affirming district court’s decision to avoid collateral mini-trials in which 
the defense and the government would offer different characterizations); United States v. 
Waloke, 962 F.2d 824, 830 (8th Cir. 1992) (discussing and affirming the lower court’s refusal to 
engage in collateral mini-trials in which each side would compete to characterize the relevant 
events differently). 
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entailing a battle of the experts regarding the probability of the 
occurrence of such a malfunction.184  Remedies for missing videos 
predicated on the blameworthiness of individual officers would 
open the door to such messy and costly inquiries.  
If remedies for missing video hinge on culpable officer conduct, 
the risk of deterring a judicial inquiry is high.  By judicial-inquiry 
deterrence, I mean the avoidance of finding a colorable claim of a 
violation, to avoid the mess and costs of wading into credibility 
contests, collateral mini-trials, and potentially finding an officer 
guilty of perjury or wrongdoing.  Scholars have used the concept of 
remedial deterrence to refer to judicial avoidance of finding a 
violation to avoid the costs of offering a remedy.185  Judicial-
inquiry deterrence as framed here operates even earlier, leading to 
curt dismissals of defense claims without significant inquiry.186
Rather than individuating blame on officers for missing 
evidence, the focus of judicial remedies should be from a systemic 
perspective on evidentiary fairness.  This perspective elevates 
courts out of the murky morass of individual blame—is this 
particular officer lying about the camera falling off or is the 
defendant lying?  Instead, the evidentiary fairness approach from 
a systemic perspective frames the problem thus: Key contested 
aspects of this encounter were not recorded even though, pursuant 
to the department’s policies, they are usually recorded.  To address 
this, remedies would focus on system integrity, including the 
underlying imbalances in evidentiary advantages between the 
police and the defendant, rather than trying to assign blame and 
guess who is lying and who is not.   
                                                                                                                   
184 See discussion supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text. 
185 See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in 
International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 759–60 (2008) (discussing remedial deterrence 
in the international criminal context). 
186 See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 373 F. App’x 386, 390–91 (4th Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the government’s destruction of video 
evidence warranted the remedy of a dismissal); United States v. Parker, 72 F.3d 1444, 1452 
(10th Cir. 1995) (upholding the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss in a 
case where a state trooper erased a video recording which may have held exculpatory 
evidence).  
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B.  PRETRIAL REMEDIES BASED ON EVIDENTIARY FAIRNESS 
An evidentiary fairness approach from a systemic perspective 
can inform the choice of remedies for missing video.  This section 
proposes three potential remedies.  To capture the bulk of criminal 
cases, which never make it to trial, the focus here is on pretrial 
remedies.  The three proposals are: (1) exclusion of partial 
recordings; (2) positive inferences to counteract the tendency to 
discredit the defendant; and (3) using institutional awareness of 
systemic facts to detect patterns of missing recordings.  Each 
proposed remedy is discussed below. 
1.  Exclusion of Partial Recordings.  Regardless of whether the 
officer was at fault for the missing video, courts can offer the 
remedy of excluding partial video where recording rules require 
recording the entire encounter.  This approach is not 
unprecedented.187  In United States v. Yevakpor, a New York 
district court excluded portions of a surveillance tape that the 
government sought to introduce because other portions were 
automatically recorded over and not preserved.188  The clips the 
government preserved showed the defendant carrying a suitcase 
with heroin at the New York Port of Entry and the search of the 
suitcase by officers.189  The court construed the defendant’s motion 
to exclude the clips as an invocation of Federal Rule of Evidence 
106’s partial codification of the Doctrine of Completeness.190
Rule 106 provides that where a party introduces a recorded 
statement, or a part of one, “an adverse party may require the 
introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other writing 
or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be at the same 
time.”191  The problem with partial video, of course, is that there is 
no other portion the adverse party can introduce.  In Yevakpor, the 
court creatively addressed this problem outside the four corners of 
                                                                                                                   
187 See United States v. Yevakpor, 419 F. Supp. 2d 242 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (excluding partial 
government surveillance tape). 
188 The recording system recorded over stored images “every 6 to 7 days.”  Id. at 244, 247, 
252. 
189 Id. at 243–45. 
190 Id. at 246–46. 
191 FED. R. EVID. 106.  The 2006 version of Rule 106 used in Yevakpor was worded 
differently, but its meaning was essentially the same. 
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the classic Rule 106 situation.192  The court noted that it did “not 
doubt the U.S. Attorney’s good faith” but that, regarding the 
routine destruction of the rest of the video, partial video recordings 
are akin to still photographs and thus pose a greater risk of scenes 
being taken out of context than the “continuous stream of 
information” that a complete video can provide.193  The court 
agreed with the defense that interpretation of the clips would be 
skewed by the lack of presentation in full context.194  Performing 
its own “pragmatic balancing test,” the court excluded the clips as 
“more prejudicial than probative.”195   
Moreover, the court put the government on notice: 
[I]f selected segments of a video or audio exhibit will 
be offered at trial, the entire video or audio exhibit had 
best be preserved . . . . Given the current state of 
affairs in our nation, when surveillance occurs both 
with and without our knowledge, a great danger to 
liberty would exist if Government could pick and 
choose segments of recordings for use in prosecution, 
destroy the remainder, and then argue that the 
defense must show that the destroyed evidence 
contained exculpatory or otherwise potentially useful 
and relevant information.  Simply put, the 
Government cannot make use of video segments that 
have been “cherry-picked” when the remainder of the 
recording has been erased or recorded-over.196
From a seemingly mundane drug-smuggling case at a port of 
entry, the court discerned the larger values at stake and the need 
to fashion a remedy that applied regardless of proof by the defense 
that the missing video was exculpatory or that the government 
acted in bad faith.  From an evidentiary fairness perspective, even 
if a recording is incomplete due to no fault of the officer, there are 
still important concerns about its admission.  Video evidence has a 
                                                                                                                   
192 Yevakpor, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 246–47. 
193 Id. at 246. 
194 Id. at 250. 
195 Id. at 250–52. 
196 Id. at 252 (citation omitted). 
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dangerous power to seem to offer the viewer the ability to see for 
him or herself what really happened.197  Yet the vantage point of 
the camera and what it catches and misses can tell a misleading 
story.198   
We do not know whether something crucial that would put 
conduct in context is cut out.  Seeing only part of the action 
without key context can lead viewers to draw the wrong 
inferences.199  For example, is a suspect apparently behaving 
belligerently toward an officer on video doing so because he was 
aggressive from the beginning of the encounter, or because the 
officer was demeaning or threatening first?  Was the suspect 
acting suspiciously from the start of a Terry stop, or does he only 
look suspicious once the camera turns on and displays the 
contraband which was found on the suspect during a stop and 
frisk?  The partial recording might be a selective presentation—or 
it might be due to mistake, technological malfunction, or exigency.  
Rather than adjudicating officer fault, however, the court could 
exclude the partial video as a matter of evidentiary fairness so the 
prosecution does not have the advantage of a partial—and 
potentially misleading—video.  
2.  Favorable Inferences.  What happens if video is missing 
altogether?  The Supreme Court has held that it is a due process 
violation for the government to fail to preserve evidence that is 
exculpatory to the defendant.200  If the defendant cannot show the 
destroyed evidence was exculpatory, and “no more can be said 
than that it . . . might have exonerated the defendant,” then the 
criminal defendant must show bad faith on the part of the 
police.201  This body of law is unavailing in the failure to record 
                                                                                                                   
197 See NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY: THE DIGITAL
TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT 8 (2009) (stating that videos can 
be “highly credible evidence of the reality they depict,” and that they are more readily 
believed than words); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright,
125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 692 & n.29 (2012) (arguing that images are often more persuasive 
than other forms of knowledge, even having the power to overcome personal memories of an 
event; but the meaning of those images always comes from interpretation). 
198 See Fan, Justice Visualized, supra note 25, at 947–52 (discussing the particular 
perspective of body-worn cameras and the point-of-view bias that can result). 
199 See, for example, Yevakpor, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 246, where the court was concerned 
that a partial recording presents an increased risk that scenes may be taken out of context. 
200 Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 55 (1988). 
201 Id. at 56–58. 
2017]         MISSING POLICE BODY CAMERA VIDEOS 101 
context for three reasons.  First, the evidence was not destroyed.  
Rather it was never created.  Second, if the evidence was never 
created, it is hard for the defendant to prove that it might be 
exculpatory.202  Third, bad faith is hard to prove because the 
officers will rarely say they were acting with bad intent and are 
likely to proffer alternative rationales, which courts are reluctant 
to suggest are false.203
It may be tempting to try to draw an analogy with spoliation 
doctrine, which also concerns remedies for missing evidence.  
Spoliation means the destruction of evidence or failure to preserve 
it for reasonably foreseeable litigation.204  More fundamentally, the 
doctrine is about the “inherent power of the courts . . . to preserve 
the integrity of the judicial process in order to retain confidence 
that the process works to uncover the truth.”205  To sanction 
spoliation, courts may infer that the information would have been 
adverse to the party.206  Many courts require a showing of 
intentional destruction in bad faith before imposing an adverse-
inference sanction.207  Others hold that bad faith is not required 
                                                                                                                   
202 Cf. Yevakpor, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 246 (“This is a harsh standard to apply considering 
that the Defendant cannot know what missing portions would be relevant” since the video 
no longer exists). 
203 See discussion supra notes 180–82. 
204 West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999). 
205 Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001). 
206 See id. at 592–93 (affirming the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, where the 
failure to preserve a motor vehicle in its “post-accident condition” “highly prejudiced” 
defendant).  
207 See, e.g., Guzman v. Jones, 804 F.3d 707, 713 (5th Cir. 2015) (“We permit an adverse 
inference against the spoliator or sanctions against the spoliator only upon a showing of 
‘bad faith’ or ‘bad conduct’ . . . Bad faith, in the context of spoliation, generally means 
destruction for the purpose of hiding adverse evidence.”); Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Murley, 
703 F.3d 456, 461 (8th Cir. 2013) (ruling that the district court must find bad faith and 
prejudice in order to give an adverse-inference instruction); Bull v. United Parcel Service, 
Inc., 665 F.3d 68, 79 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing the “pivotal” role of bad faith in sanctionable 
spoliation); Norman-Nunnery v. Madison Area Tech. Coll., 625 F.3d 422, 428 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(requiring the party seeking an adverse inference to “demonstrate that the defendants 
intentionally destroyed the documents in bad faith,” explaining “[t]he crucial element in a 
spoliation claim is not the fact that documents were destroyed but that they were destroyed 
for the purpose of hiding adverse information”); Turner v. Public Serv. Co., 563 F.3d 1136, 
1149 (10th Cir. 2009) (“But if the aggrieved party seeks an adverse inference to remedy the 
spoliation, it must also prove bad faith.”); Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929, 931 (11th Cir. 
1997) (“In this circuit, an adverse inference is drawn from a party’s failure to preserve 
evidence only when the absence of that evidence is predicated on bad faith.”); see also 89 
C.J.S. Trial § 671 (2017) (“The jury should be given an adverse-inference instruction on 
spoliation of evidence if the requesting party makes a threshold showing that the opposing 
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and instead use other criteria, such as willful conduct or notice 
that the evidence was potentially relevant to the litigation.208   
Civil rights plaintiffs attempting to allege spoliation based on a 
recording omission or destruction have failed because of an 
inability to show bad faith and the availability of other 
explanations, such as officer inexperience.209  Classic spoliation 
doctrine is even more difficult to apply in the context of an officer’s 
decision not to record altogether.  The failure to record is a 
particularly ambiguous context because evidence was not 
destroyed.  Rather it never existed.  Culpable bad faith—acting 
with the purpose of destroying evidence to hide adverse 
information210—is even harder to allege because of the legitimate 
reasons officers may proffer for not recording in the field.211  The 
remedy would be merely theoretical rather than attainable 
because of the difficulty of demonstrating that a video that never 
existed would have contained adverse information.212  While some 
                                                                                                                   
party improperly caused the loss of the evidence.”); 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 256 (“[T]he 
intentional spoliation . . . of evidence relevant to a case raises . . . an inference[ ] that this 
evidence would have been unfavorable. . . . The inference does not arise where the 
destruction was a matter of routine with no fraudulent intent.”).  
208 See, e.g., Grosdidier v. Broadcasting Bd. of Governors, 709 F.3d 19, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(ruling that a showing of bad faith is not required); Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 360 
F.3d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that bad faith is not always necessary for 
sanctionable spoliation and willful conduct suffices); Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, 243 F.3d 
93, 109 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a spoliation claim can be based on a violation of 
regulatory duty to keep records if the records “were destroyed with a culpable state of mind 
(i.e. where, for example, the records were destroyed knowingly, even if without intent to 
violate the regulation, or negligently)” and “the destroyed records were relevant to the 
party’s claim or defense”); Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329–30 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that bad faith is not required and notice that evidence is relevant to the litigation 
and failure to preserve suffice). 
209 See, e.g., Victor v. Lawler, 520 F. App’x 103, 105–06 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curium) 
(holding that the officer failed to record due to inexperience and not bad faith).  Cf., e.g.,
Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1019 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that the civil rights plaintiff 
failed to show bad faith on the part of prison guards who did not preserve video recordings 
of an incident).  
210 See Mathis v. John Morden Buick, Inc., 136 F.3d 1153, 1155 (7th Cir. 1998) (defining 
“bad faith” as “destruction for the purpose of hiding adverse information”). 
211 See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the possible legitimate reasons for a failure 
to record an incident, including technical malfunctions and either forgetting or not having 
time to “hit record” during the heat of a particularly stressful encounter).   
212 See, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616 n.6 (2004) (plurality opinion) (noting 
that officer intent is rarely openly revealed); United States v. Martinez, No. 11-10195-RWZ, 
2013 WL 49767, at *6–7 (D. Mass. 2013) (finding no bad faith when the government failed 
to preserve videos the defendant claimed might have contained exculpatory information).  
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courts do not require a showing of bad faith for an adverse 
inference, many do because of “the gravity of an adverse inference 
instruction, which ‘brands one party as a bad actor.’ ”213
To surmount this dilemma, this Article proposes a positive 
inference when video of a law enforcement encounter that should 
be recorded is missing.  This positive rather than adverse, 
inference could apply regardless of the culpability of the officer in 
the failure to record.  The positive inference would be that the 
missing video could have information that supports the defense.  
This positive framing spares the culpability connotations of an 
adverse inference that video is missing because the officer knew he 
had something to hide.  Rather than an adverse inference 
branding a party as a “bad actor” in destroying evidence, a 
favorable inference is a credibility-reinforcing move.  It 
counteracts the systemic imbalance in credibility capital that 
defendants face in the criminal justice system.214  It puts a thumb 
on the scale of inferences in favor of the defendant without 
necessitating a finding that recording was subverted to hide 
damaging evidence.  A recording could be missing for wholly 
legitimate reasons and yet still contain information that could 
support the defense. 
3.  Pattern and Practice Detection.  Finally, a systemic 
perspective also widens the horizon of remedies beyond the 
individual case level to a systemic level.  This proposal draws on 
Andrew Crespo’s important call for courts to use their privileged 
access to systemic facts to advance beyond transactional myopia in 
criminal procedure.215  Transactional myopia refers to the 
tendency to focus on the specific facts in a particular criminal 
procedure case before the court.216  Systemic facts refers to the 
                                                                                                                   
Cf. Bracey, 712 F.3d at 1019 (“Without having seen the video, no prison official could have 
known the tapes potentially contained adverse information and, without that knowledge, 
could have destroyed the tapes for the purpose of hiding adverse information.”).  
213 See, e.g., Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Murley, 703 F.3d 456, 461 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir. 2004)).  See also supra note 207 for 
numerous examples of courts requiring a showing of bad faith before sanctioning a party 
with an adverse inference. 
214 See discussion supra notes 173–82 (discussing the “severe credibility problem” defendants 
face). 
215 Crespo, supra note 36. 
216 See id. at 2057 (explaining that “constitutional criminal adjudication . . . is largely 
transactional in nature, focusing on the ‘one-off interaction typified by the singular’ search, 
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larger pattern of data that courts can detect and interpret based 
on information acquired over time by processing many criminal 
procedure cases.217      
Courts have amassed a valuable trove of systemic facts in their 
filing cabinets, online data systems, and transcripts.218  This can 
help courts more accurately detect systemic problems and 
adjudicate between competing claims.  For example, in justifying a 
search or seizure, do the police always use standard-form 
boilerplate language?219  How likely is it for warrants issued based 
on such boilerplate recitations to yield the evidence sought?220  A 
word search using high-speed software through digitized search 
warrant affidavits and inventories can detect such a pattern.221   
A defendant in a particular case alleging that crucial video 
footage is missing may just seem to be an isolated case, or give the 
impression of grasping at straws to create a defense.  But high-
speed searches of motions filed over time can detect patterns in 
alleged missing evidence.  Do the claims tend to involve the same 
law enforcement agency unit, or even the same officers?  Do the 
claims cluster around particular kinds of cases or neighborhoods, 
potentially unveiling an off-the-books tactic in a particular kind of 
investigation or among a particular team?  This form of judicial 
audit can supplement internal departmental enforcement 
mechanisms.  Detection of problematic patterns can inform judges 
if they need to start stepping up scrutiny—and whether wading 
into the morass of fault for missing video is warranted.     
                                                                                                                   
seizure or prosecution of ‘a particular suspect for a specific crime’ ” (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV.
1039, 1039 (2016)). 
217 See id. at 2066–68 (describing systemic facts as “information with respect to which a 
given decisionmaking institution enjoys deep institutional familiarity, privileged (or 
perhaps even exclusive) access, or both”). 
218 See, e.g., id. at 2072–75 (describing the Superior Court of the District of Columbia’s 
catalogued and digitized information on probable-cause documentation, including written 
affidavits and hearing transcripts). 
219 See id. at 2074–85 (providing examples of “routine factual representations,” such as 
“high-crime areas”). 
220 See id. at 2085 (reporting that searches sanctioned by warrants obtained through the 
use of “probable-cause scripts” more often than not fail to yield the evidence sought, using 
firearms (91% failure rate) and drugs (66% failure rate) as examples). 
221 See id. at 2074, 2082–85 (explaining how cumulative information can be used by courts 
to assess the descriptive and predictive accuracy of probable-cause scripts). 
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V. CONCLUSION: AUTOMATIC CAMERA ACTIVATION
On paper, a revolution in police regulation by recording seems 
to be sweeping the world of law enforcement, as departments 
around the nation adopt body camera recording mandates in 
response to calls for reform.  On the ground, however, problems 
with nonrecording or recording after the crucial moment are 
emerging.  Controversies over missing video are raising important 
questions about how to enforce recording requirements and protect 
system integrity against partial or missing videos.  
Internal departmental enforcement of recording rules is 
challenging because of the individual fault-based nature of 
disciplinary processes as well as the management-labor 
negotiations and protections.  Courts are better institutionally 
situated to ensure a fair and accurate video evidentiary record.  
The challenge is determining what remedies to offer when video 
that should be available under departmental recording rules is 
missing.  Remedies requiring a showing of bad faith on the part of 
the officers are illusory.  The blame approach is predetermined to 
fail because of the reluctance of courts to find that officers are 
perjurers; to wade into costly mini-trials on collateral evidentiary 
issues; and to second-guess the judgment calls of officers in the 
heat and stress of the field.  Remedies contingent on finding 
culpability are likely to lead to judicial-inquiry deterrence, in 
which courts dismiss claims regarding missing video with little or 
no inquiry because of the costs of parsing officer fault. 
This Article proposes an evidentiary fairness approach that 
avoids wading into the messy morass of individual blame.  Under 
this approach, partial recordings should be excluded because of the 
tendency to mislead rather than as a sanction based on a finding of 
officer wrongdoing.  Where video is missing altogether, an 
inference that the video could contain information favorable to the 
defense should be drawn.  This contrasts with spoliation doctrine, 
which often requires a showing of bad faith before imposing the 
adverse inference that a party destroyed or failed to preserve 
evidence because it was favorable to the other party.  
Furthermore, courts can use their repository of motions and other 
documents or information regarding missing video to detect 
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potentially problematic systemic patterns that warrant heightened 
scrutiny—and can perhaps even wade into the morass of fault. 
Beyond any stop-gap remedies for missing video, the optimal 
approach ultimately is to prevent the problem from arising by 
automating recording.222  Rather than expecting officers acting in 
the heat and stress of unfolding situations to remember to record, 
technology can activate recording upon pre-determined triggers 
such as motion, sounds, physiological indicators, or activation of 
sirens.  Companies are beginning to offer automatic recording 
solutions that rely on triggers such as the boom of a gunshot; the 
drawing of a gun or Taser; exceeding a certain speed; the opening 
of a door; the activation of sirens; entering a geo-fenced area 
designated “high-crime”; or indicators of an officer’s physiological 
stress.223  Currently available technology can even automatically 
activate the body cameras of other officers within a certain radius 
of the event so that more cameras are offering context from 
different angles.224  These are important developments.  The 
automation of recording can help avert the controversy, pain, and 
accusations over missing video after a tragedy.  Technology also 
                                                                                                                   
222 I am exploring the technological dimension in a forthcoming book.  MARY D. FAN,
CAMERA POWER: PROOF, POLICING AND PRIVACY (forthcoming 2018). 
223 See Laura Diaz-Zuniga, New Bodycams Start Recording with the Draw of A Gun, CNN 
(July 21, 2017, 7:11 PM), http://cnn.it/2vJNMQr (discussing automatic activation technology 
triggered by the removal of a weapon from its holster); Robert Maxwell, Lakeway Police 
First to Use Automatic Body Cameras, KXAN (Austin, Tex.) (June 12, 2015, 4:57 PM), 
http://kxan.com/2015/06/12/lakeway-police-first-to-use-automatic-body-cameras/ (discussing 
recording activation triggers linked to a patrol vehicle’s “lights, siren, brake system, airbag, 
dome light or doors”); Ryan Mason, More than A Body Cam, POLICE: THE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT MAGAZINE (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.policemag.com/channel/technology/ar 
ticles/2015/04/more-than-a-body-cam.aspx (describing Utility’s system, which “allows the 
camera to automatically activate based on policies set by the agency” and triggers such as 
the vehicle speeding over seventy-five miles per hour, entering into a geo-fenced area, or 
during certain types of interactions). 
224 See Nick Wing, New Police Body Camera Device Starts Recording When Cops Draw Guns,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2017, 6:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/taser-signal-
police-body-camera_us_58b72c32e4b0284854b385b2 (describing the Signal Sidearm product 
from Axon (Taser), which activates the officer’s body camera as well as other body cameras 
within thirty-feet, upon the drawing of the officer’s firearm from its holster); Michael Fleeman 
et al., L.A. Police to Get Tasers that Activate Body Cameras When Used, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 
2015, 6:40 PM), http://reut.rs/1xPDACa (discussing Los Angeles Police Department’s purchase 
of the Taser X26P weapon, which is linked via Bluetooth to Taser’s body cameras, “turn[s] on 
the camera the second the Taser’s safety switch is thrown,” and “record[s] the date, time and 
duration of firing, and whether Taser wires actually strike suspects and how long the 
thousands of volts of electricity pulse through them.”). 
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can help address mistrust over police discretionary decisions, 
including the decision whether to record.225  While framing 
effective remedies for errors and omissions is important, the 
optimal approach is to reduce the risk of such problems arising 
altogether, sparing police departments, the community, and the 
courts the controversy and costs of redressing the missing video 
problem.
                                                                                                                   
225 See Joh, supra note 151, at 216–25 (discussing how technology can help address 
controversies over police discretion in contexts such as traffic stops). 
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APPENDIX A
The following jurisdictions, organized by population size in 
descending order, are among the nation’s 100 largest municipalities 
that had body camera policies available for collection and coding: 
1. New York, NY 21. Milwaukee, WI 41. Anaheim, CA 
2. Los Angeles, CA 22. Las Vegas, NV 42. Aurora, CO 
3. Chicago, IL 23. Albuquerque, NM 43. St. Louis, MO 
4. Houston, TX 24. Tucson, AZ 44. Riverside, CA 
5. Philadelphia, PA 25. Fresno, CA 45. Corpus Christi, TX 
6. San Antonio, TX 26. Sacramento, CA 46. Lexington, KY 
7. San Diego, CA 27. Long Beach, CA 47. Stockton, CA 
8. Dallas, TX 28. Mesa, AZ 48. Cincinnati, OH 
9. San Jose, CA 29. Virginia Beach, VA 49. St. Paul, MN 
10. Austin, TX 30. Atlanta, GA 50. Toledo, OH 
11. San Francisco, CA 31. Colorado Springs, CO 51. Greensboro, NC 
12. Fort Worth, TX 32. Raleigh, NC 52. Chula Vista, CA 
13. Charlotte, NC 33. Omaha, NE 53. Durham, NC 
14. Memphis, TN 34. Miami, FL 54. Winston-Salem, NC 
15. Boston, MA 35. Oakland, CA 55. Chesapeake, VA 
16. Seattle, WA 36. Minneapolis, MN 56. Scottsdale, AZ 
17. Denver, CO 37. Cleveland, OH 57. Fremont, CA 
18. Baltimore, MD 38. Wichita, KS 58. Gilbert, AZ 
19. Portland, OR 39. New Orleans, LA 59. Boise, ID 
20. Oklahoma City, OK 40. Tampa, FL 
